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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a novel rule for synthesis of reactive systems, applicable to systems made
of n components which have each their own objectives. It is based on the notion of admissible strategies.
We compare our novel rule with previous rules defined in the literature, and we show that contrary to
the previous proposals, our rule defines sets of solutions which are rectangular. This property leads to
solutions which are robust and resilient. We provide algorithms with optimal complexity and also an
abstraction framework.
1 Introduction
The automatic synthesis of reactive systems has recently attracted a considerable attention. The theoretical
foundations of most of the contributions in this area rely on two-player zero sum games played on graphs: one
player (player 1) models the system to synthesize, and the other player (player 2) models its environment.
The game is zero-sum: the objective of player 1 is to enforce the specification of the system while the objective
of player 2 is the negation of this specification. This is a worst-case assumption: because the cooperation of
the environment cannot be assumed, we postulate that it is antagonistic.
A fully adversarial environment is usually a bold abstraction of reality. Nevertheless, it is popular because
it is simple and sound: a winning strategy against an antagonistic player is winning against any environment
which pursues its own objective. But this approach may fail to find a winning strategy even if there exist
solutions when the objective of the environment is taken into account. Also, this model is for two players
only: system vs environment. In practice, both the system and the environment may be composed of several
parts to be constructed individually or whose objectives should be considered one at a time. It is thus crucial
to take into account different players’ objectives when synthesizing strategies; accordingly, alternative notions
have been proposed in the literature.
A first classical alternative is to weaken the winning condition of player 1 using the objective of the
environment, requiring the system to win only when the environment meets its objective. This approach
together with its weaknesses have been discussed in [3], we will add to that later in the paper. A second
alternative is to use concepts from n-players non-zero sum games. This is the approach taken both by
assume-guarantee synthesis [6] (AG), and by rational synthesis [16] (RS). AG relies on secure equilibria [8]
(SE), a refinement of Nash equilibria [25] (NE). In SE, objectives are lexicographic: players first try to
maximize their own specifications, and then try to falsify the specifications of others. It is shown in [8]
that SE are those NE which represent enforceable contracts between the two players. In RS, the system is
assumed to be monolithic and the environment is made of components that are partially controllable. In RS,
we search for a profile of strategies where the system ensures its objective and the players that model the
environment are given an “acceptable” strategy profiles, from which it is assumed that they will not deviate.
“Acceptable” is formalized either by NE, dominating strategies (Dom), or subgame perfect equilibria (SPE).
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Contributions. As a first and central contribution, we propose a novel notion of synthesis where we take
into account different players’ objectives using the concept of admissible strategies [1, 2, 4]. For a player with
objective φ, a strategy σ is dominated by σ′ if σ′ does as well as σ w.r.t. φ against all strategies of the other
players, and better for some of those strategies. A strategy σ is admissible if it is not dominated by another
strategy. In [2], the admissibility notion was lifted to games played on graphs, and algorithmic questions left
open were solved in [4], with the goal of model checking the set of runs that survive the iterative elimination
of dominated strategies. Here, we use this notion to derive a meaningful notion to synthesize systems
with several players, with the following idea. Rational players should only play admissible strategies since
dominated strategies are clearly suboptimal. In assume-admissible synthesis (AA), we make the assumption
that players play admissible strategies. Then for each player, we search for an admissible strategy that is
winning against all admissible strategies of other players. AA is sound: any strategy profile that is winning
against admissible strategies of other players, satisfies the objectives of all the players (Theorem 1).
As a second contribution, we compare the different synthesis rules. First we apply all the rules on a
simple but representative example, and show the main advantages of AA w.r.t. the other rules. Then we
compare systematically the different approaches. We show when a solution for one rule implies a solution for
another rule and we prove that, contrary to other rules, AA yields rectangular sets of solutions (Theorem 3).
We argue that the rectangularity property is essential for practical applications.
As a third contribution, we provide algorithms to decide the existence of assume-admissible winning
strategy profiles and prove the optimal complexity of our algorithm (Theorem 4): PSPACE-complete for
Mu¨ller, and PTIME for Bu¨chi objectives.
As a last important contribution, we provide an abstraction framework which allows us to define sufficient
conditions to compute sets of winning assume-admissible strategies for each player in the game composition-
ally (Theorem 5).
Additional pointers to related works. We have already mentioned assume-guarantee synthesis [6] and
rational synthesis [16, 21]. Those are the closest related works to ours as they pursue the same scientific
objective: to synthesis strategy profiles for non-zero sum multi-player games by taking into account the
specification of each player. As those works are defined for similar formal setting, we are able to provide
formal statements in the core of the paper that add elements of comparison with our work.
In [15], Faella studies several alternatives to the notion of winning strategy including the notion of
admissible strategy. His work is for two-players only, and only the objective of one player is taken into
account, the objective of the other player is left unspecified. Faella uses the notion of admissibility to define
a notion of best-effort in synthesis while we use the notion of admissibility to take into account the objectives
of the other players in an n player setting where each player has his own objective.
The notion of admissible strategy is definable in strategy logics [9, 24] and decision problems related
to the AA rule can be reduced to satisfiability queries in such logics. Nevertheless this would not lead to
worst-case optimal algorithms. Based on our previous work [4], we develop in this paper worst-case optimal
algorithms.
In [12], Damm and Finkbeiner use the notion of dominant strategy to provide a compositional semi-
algorithm for the (undecidable) distributed synthesis problem. So while we use the notion of admissible
strategy, they use a notion of dominant strategy. The notion of dominant strategy is strictly stronger: every
dominant strategy is admissible but an admissible strategy is not necessary dominant. Also, in multiplayer
games with omega-regular objectives with complete information (as considered here), admissible strategies
are always guaranteed to exist [2] while it is not the case for dominant strategies. We will show in an example
that the notion of dominant strategy is too strong for our purpose. Also, note that the objective of Damm
and Finkbeiner is different from ours: they use dominance as a mean to formalize a notion of best-effort for
components of a distributed system w.r.t. their common objective, while we use admissibility to take into
account the objectives of the other components when looking for a winning strategy for one component to
enforce its own objective. Additionally, our formal setting is different from their setting in several respects.
First, they consider zero-sum games between a distributed team of players (processes) against a unique
environment, each player in the team has the same specification (the specification of the distributed system
to synthesize) while the environment is considered as adversarial and so its specification is the negation of
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the specification of the system. In our case, each player has his own objective and we do not distinguish
between protagonist and antagonist players. Second, they consider distributed synthesis: each individual
process has its own view of the system while we consider games with perfect information in which all players
have a complete view of the system state. Finally, let us point out that Damm and Finkbeiner use the term
admissible for specifications and not for strategies (as already said, they indeed consider dominant strategies
and not admissible strategies). In our case, we use the notion of admissible strategy which is classical in
game theory, see e.g. [17, 1]. This vocabulary mismatch is unfortunate but we decided to stick to the term
of “admissible strategy” which is well accepted in the literature, and already used in several previous works
on (multi-player) games played on graphs [2, 15, 4].
Structure of the paper. Sect. 2 contains definitions. In Sect. 3, we review synthesis rules introduced in
the literature and define assume-admissible synthesis. In Sect. 4, we consider an example; this allows us to
underline some weaknesses of the previous rules. Sect. 5 presents a formal comparison of the different rules.
Sect. 6 contains algorithms for Bu¨chi and Mu¨ller objectives, and Sect. 7 abstraction techniques applied to
our rule.
2 Definitions
A turn-based multiplayer arena is a tuple A = 〈P , (Si)i∈P , sinit, (Acti)i∈P , δ〉 where P is a finite set of players;
for i ∈ P , Si is a finite set of player-i states; we let S =
⊎
i∈P Si; sinit ∈ S is the initial state; for every i ∈ P ,
Acti is the set of player-i actions; we let Act =
⋃
i∈P Acti; and δ : S× Act 7→ S is the transition function. A
run ρ is a sequence of alternating states and actions ρ = s1a1s2a2 . . . ∈ (S · Act)ω such that for all i ≥ 1,
δ(si, ai) = si+1. We write ρi = si, and acti(ρ) = ai. A history is a finite prefix of a run ending in a state.
We denote by ρ≤k the history s1a1 . . . sk; and write last(ρ≤k) = sk, the last state of the history. The set of
states occurring infinitely often in a run ρ is Inf(ρ) = {s ∈ S | ∀j ∈ N. ∃i > j, ρi = s}.
A strategy of player i is a function σi : (S
∗ · Si)→ Acti. A strategy profile for the set of players P ⊆ P is
a tuple of strategies, one for each player of P . We write −i for the set P \ {i}. Let Σi(A) be the set of the
strategies of player i in A, written Σi if A is clear from context, and ΣP the strategy profiles of P ⊆ P .
A run ρ is compatible with strategy σ for player i if for all j ≥ 1, ρj ∈ Si implies actj(ρ) = σ(ρ≤j). It
is compatible with strategy profile σP if it is compatible with each σi for i ∈ P . The outcome of a strategy
profile σP is the unique run compatible with σP starting at sinit, denoted OutA(σP ). We write OutA,s(σP )
for the outcome starting at state s. Given σP ∈ ΣP with P ⊆ P , let OutA(σP ) denote the set of runs
compatible with σP , and extend it to OutA(Σ
′) where Σ′ is a set of strategy profiles. For E ⊆ Si × Acti, let
Strati(E) denote the set of player-i strategies σ whose compatible outcomes use action a from a state s only
if (s, a) ∈ E.
An objective φ is a subset of runs. A strategy σi of player i is winning for objective φi if for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i,
OutA(σi, σ−i) ∈ φi. A game is an arena equipped with an objective for each player, written G = 〈A, (φi)i∈P 〉
where for each player i, φi is an objective. Given a strategy profile σP for the set of players P , we write
G, σP |= φ if OutA(σP ) ⊆ φ. We write OutG(σP ) = OutA(σP ), and OutG = OutG(Σ) for Σ ⊆ Σi. For any
coalition C ⊆ P , and objective φ, we denote by WinC(A, φ) the set of states s such that there exists σC ∈ ΣC
with OutG,s(σC) ⊆ φ.
Although we prove some of our results for general objectives, we give algorithms for ω-regular objectives
represented by Muller conditions. A Muller condition is given by a family F of sets of states: φi = {ρ |
Inf(ρ) ∈ F}. Following [19], we assume that F is given by a Boolean circuit whose inputs are S, which
evaluates to true exactly on valuations encoding subsets S ∈ F . We also use linear temporal logic (LTL) [27]
to describe objectives. LTL formulas are defined by φ := Gφ | Fφ | Xφ | φUφ | φWφ | S where S ⊆ S
(We refer to [14] for the semantics.) We consider the special case of Bu¨chi objectives, given by GF(B) =
{ρ | B ∩ Inf(ρ) 6= ∅}. Boolean combinations of formulas GF(S) define Muller conditions representable by
polynomial-size circuits.
In any game G, a player i strategy σi is dominated by σ
′
i if for all σ−i ∈ Σ−i, G, σi, σ−i |= φi implies
G, σ′i, σ−i |= φi and there exists σ−i ∈ Σ−i, such that G, σ
′
i, σ−i |= φi and G, σi, σ−i 6|= φi, (this is classically
called weak dominance, but we call it dominance for simplicity). A strategy which is not dominated is
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admissible. Thus, admissible strategies are maximal, and incomparable, with respect to the dominance
relation. We write Admi(G) for the set of admissible strategies in Σi, and AdmP (G) =
∏
i∈P Admi(G) the
product of the sets of admissible strategies for P ⊆ P .
Strategy σi is dominant (Dom) if for all σ
′
i and σ−i, G, σ
′
i, σ−i |= φi implies G, σi, σ−i |= φi. The set of
dominant strategies for player i is written Domi(G). A Nash equilibrium (NE) for G is a strategy profile σP
such that for all i ∈ P , and σ′i ∈ Σi, G, σ−i, σ
′
i |= φi implies G, σP |= φi; thus no player can improve its
outcome by deviating from the prescribed strategy. A Nash equilibrium for G from s, is a Nash equilibrium
for G where the initial state is replaced by s. A subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) for G is a strategy
profile σP such that for all histories h, (σi ◦ h)i∈P is a Nash equilibrium in G from state last(h), where given
a strategy σ, σ ◦ h denotes the strategy last(h) · h′ 7→ σ(h · h′).
3 Synthesis Rules
In this section, we review synthesis rules proposed in the literature, and introduce a novel one: the assume-
admissible synthesis rule (AA). Unless stated otherwise, we fix for this section a game G, with players
P = {1, . . . , n} and their objectives φ1, . . . , φn.
Rule Coop: The objectives are achieved cooperatively if there is a strategy profile σP = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σn) such
that G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi.
This rule [23, 10] asks for a strategy profile that jointly satisfies the objectives of all the players. This
rule makes very strong assumptions: players fully cooperate and strictly follow their respective strategies.
This concept is not robust against deviations and postulates that the behavior of every component in the
system is controllable. This weakness is well-known: see e.g. [6] where the rule is called weak co-synthesis.
Rule Win. The objectives are achieved adversarially if there is a strategy profile σP = (σ1, . . . , σn) such
that for all i ∈ P , G, σi |= φi.
This rule does not require any cooperation among players: the rule asks to synthesize for each player i
a strategy which enforces his/her objective φi against all possible strategies of the other players. Strategy
profiles obtained by Win are extremely robust: each player is able to ensure his/her objective no matter how
the other players behave. Unfortunately, this rule is often not applicable in practice: often, none of the
players has a winning strategy against all possible strategies of the other players. The next rules soften this
requirement by taking into account the objectives of other players.
Rule Win-under-Hyp: Given a two-player game G with P = {1, 2} in which player 1 has objective φ1,
player 2 has objective φ2, player 1 can achieve adversarially φ1 under hypothesis φ2, if there is a strategy σ1
for player 1 such that G, σ1 |= φ2 → φ1.
The rule winning under hypothesis applies for two-player games only. Here, we consider the synthesis
of a strategy for player 1 against player 2 under the hypothesis that player 2 behaves according to his/her
specification. This rule is a relaxation of the rule Win as player 1 is only expected to win when player 2 plays
so that the outcome of the game satisfies φ2. While this rule is often reasonable, it is fundamentally plagued
by the following problem: instead of trying to satisfy φ1, player 1 could try to falsify φ2, see e.g. [3]. This
problem disappears if player 2 has a winning strategy to enforce φ2, and the rule is then safe. We come back
to that later in the paper (see Lemma 1).
Chatterjee et al. in [6] proposed synthesis rules inspired by Win-under-Hyp but avoid the aforementioned
problem. The rule was originally proposed in a model with two components and a scheduler. We study here
two natural extensions for n players.
Rules AG∧ and AG∨: The objectives are achieved by
(AG∧) assume-guarantee-∧ if there exists a strategy profile σP such that
1. G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi, 2. for all players i, G, σi |= (
∧
j∈P\{i} φj)⇒ φi.
(AG∨) assume-guarantee-∨1 if there exists a strategy profile σP such that
1. G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi, 2. for all players i, G, σi |= (
∨
j∈P\{i} φj)⇒ φi.
1This rule was introduced in [5], under the name Doomsday equilibria, as a generalization of the AG rule of [6] to the case of
n-players.
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The two rules differ in the second requirement: AG∧ requires that player i wins whenever all the other
players win, while AG∨ requires player i to win whenever one of the other player wins. Clearly AG∨ is
stronger, and the two rules are equivalent for two-player games. As shown in [8], for two-player games,
a profile of strategy for AG∧ (or AG∨) is a Nash equilibrium in a derived game where players want, in
lexicographic order, first to satisfy their own objectives, and then as a secondary objective, want to falsify
the objectives of the other players. As NE, AG∧ and AG∨ require players to synchronize on a particular
strategy profiles. As we will see, this is not the case for the new rule that we propose.
[16] and [21] introduce two versions of rational synthesis (RS). In the two cases, one of the player, say
player 1, models the system while the other players model the environment. The existential version (RS∃)
searches for a strategy for the system, and a profile of strategies for the environment, such that the objective
of the system is satisfied, and the profile for the environment is stable according to a solution concept which
is either NE, SPE, or Dom. The universal version (RS∀) searches for a strategy for the system, such that
for all environment strategy profiles that are stable according to the solution concept, the objective of the
system holds. We write ΣNEG,σ1 , resp. Σ
SPE
G,σ1
, for the set of strategy profiles σ−1 = (σ2, σ3, . . . , σn) that are
NE (resp. SPE) equilibria in the game G when player 1 plays σ1, and Σ
Dom
G,σ1
for the set of strategy profiles
σ−1 where each strategy σj , 2 ≤ j ≤ n, is dominant in the game G when player 1 plays σ1.
Rules RS∃,∀(NE, SPE,Dom): Let γ ∈ {NE, SPE,Dom}, the objective is achieved by:
(RS∃(γ)) existential rational synthesis under γ if there is a strategy σ1 of player 1, and a profile σ−1 ∈ Σ
γ
G,σ1
,
such that G, σ1, σ−1 |= φ1.
(RS∀(γ)) universal rational synthesis under γ if there is a strategy σ1 of player 1, such that Σ
γ
G,σ1
6= ∅, and
for all σ−1 ∈ Σ
γ
G,σ1
, G, σ1, σ−1 |= φ1.
Clearly, (RS∀(γ)) is stronger than (RS∃(γ)) and more robust. As RS∃,∀(NE, SPE) are derived from NE and
SPE, they require players to synchronize on particular strategy profiles.
Novel rule We now present our novel rule based on the notion of admissible strategies.
Rule AA: The objectives are achieved by assume-admissible (AA) strategies if there is a strategy profile σP
such that: 1. for all i ∈ P , σi ∈ Admi(G); 2. for all i ∈ P , ∀σ′−i ∈ Adm−i(G). G, σ
′
−i, σi |= φi.
A player-i strategy satisfying conditions 1 and 2 above is called assume-admissible-winning (AA-winning).
A profile of AA-winning strategies is an AA-winning strategy profile. The rule AA requires that each player
has a strategy winning against admissible strategies of other players. So we assume that players do not play
strategies which are dominated, which is reasonable as dominated strategies are clearly suboptimal options.
Contrary to Coop, AG∧, and AG∨, AA does not require that the strategy profile is winning for each player.
As for Win, this is a consequence of the definition:
Theorem 1. For all AA-winning strategy profile σP , G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi.
The condition that AA strategies are admissible is necessary for Thm. 1; it does not suffice to have
strategies that are winning against admissible strategies (see Appendix).
4 Synthesis Rules at the Light of an Example
We illustrate the synthesis rules on an example of a real-time scheduler with two tasks. The system is
composed of Sched (player 1) and Env (player 2). Env chooses the truth value for r1, r2 (ri is a request for
task i), and Sched controls q1, q2 (qi means that task i has been scheduled). Our model is a turn-based game:
first, Env chooses a value for r1, r2, then in the next round Sched chooses a value for q1, q2, and we repeat
forever. The requirements for Sched and Env are as follows: 1. Sched is not allowed to schedule the two tasks
at the same time. When r1 is true, then task 1 must be scheduled (q1) within three rounds. When r2 is true,
task 2 must be scheduled (q2) in exactly three rounds. 2. Whenever Env issues ri then it does not issue this
request again before the occurrence of the grant qi. Env issues infinitely many requests r1 and r2. We say
that a request ri is pending whenever the corresponding grant has not yet been issued. Those requirements
can be expressed in LTL as follows:
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• φSched = G(r1 → Xq1 ∨ XXXq1) ∧ G(r2 → XXXq2) ∧ G¬(q1 ∧ q2).
• φEnv = G(r1 → X(¬r1Wq1)) ∧ G(r2 → X(¬r2Wq2)) ∧ (GFr1) ∧ (GFr2).
A solution compatible with the previous rules in the literature. First, we note that there is no
winning strategy neither for Sched, nor for Env. In fact, first let σˆ1 be the strategy of Sched that never
schedules any of the two tasks, i.e. leaves q1 and q2 constantly false. This is clearly forcing ¬φEnv against all
strategies of Env. Second, let σˆ2 be s.t. Env always requests the scheduling of both task 1 and task 2, i.e.
r1 and r2 are constantly true. It is easy to see that this enforces ¬φSched against any strategy of Sched. So,
there is no solution with rule Win2. But clearly those strategies are also not compatible with the objectives
of the respective players, so this leaves the possibility to apply successfully the other rules. We now consider
a strategy profile which is a solution for all the rules except for AA.
Let (σ1, σ2) be strategies for player 1 and 2 respectively, such that the outcome of (σ1, σ2) is ”Env emits
r1, then Sched emits q1, Env emits r2, then Sched waits one round and emits q2, and repeat.” If a deviation
from this exact execution is observed, then the two players switch to strategies σˆ1 and σˆ2 respectively, i.e. to
the strategies that falsify the specification of the other players. The reader can now convince himself/herself
that (σ1, σ2) is a solution for Coop, AG and RS
∃(NE, SPE,Dom). Furthermore, we claim that σ1 is a solution
for Win-under-Hyp and RS∀(NE, SPE,Dom).3 But, assume now that Env is a device driver which requests
the scheduling of tasks by the scheduler of the kernel of an OS. Clearly (σ1, σ2), which is compatible with
all the previous rules (but Win), makes little sense in this context. On the other hand, φSched and φEnv are
natural specifications for such a system. So, there is clearly room for other synthesis rules!
Solutions provided by AA, our novel rule. For Env, we claim that the set of admissible strategies,
noted Adm(φEnv), are exactly those that (i) do not emit a new request before the previous one has been
acknowledged, and (ii) do always eventually emit a (new) request when the previous one has been granted.
Indeed as we have seen above, Env and Sched can cooperate to satisfy φSched ∧ φEnv, so any strategy of Env
which would imply the falsification of φEnv is dominated and so it is not admissible. Also, we have seen that
Env does not have a winning strategy for φEnv, so Env cannot do better.
Now, let us consider the following strategy for Sched. (i) if pending requests r1 and r2 were made one
round ago, then grant q1; if pending requests r1 and r2 were made three rounds ago, then behave arbitrarily
(it is no more possible to satisfy the specification); (ii) if pending request r2 was made three rounds ago, but
not r1, then grant q2; (iii) if pending r1 was made three rounds ago, but not r2, then grant q1. We claim
that this strategy is admissible and while it is not winning against all possible strategies of Env, it is winning
against all admissible strategies of Env. So, this strategy enforces φSched against all reasonable strategies of
Env w.r.t. to his/her own objective φEnv. In fact, there is a whole set of such strategies for Sched, noted
WinAdmSched. Similarly, there is a whole set of strategies for Env which are both admissible and winning
against the admissible strategies of Sched, noted WinAdmEnv. We prove in the next section that the solutions
to AA are rectangular sets: they are exactly the solutions in WinAdmSched ×WinAdmEnv. This ensures that
AA leads to resilient solutions: players do not need to synchronize with the other players on a particular
strategy profile but they can arbitrarily choose inside their sets of strategies that are admissible and winning
against the admissible strategies of the other players.
5 Comparison of Synthesis Rules
In this section, we compare the synthesis rules to understand which ones yield solutions more often, and to
assess their robustness. Some relations are easy to establish; for instance, rules Win,AG∨,AG∧,AA imply
Coop by definition (and Thm. 1). We summarize the implication relations between the rules in Fig. 1. We
present the rules AG∨,AG∧, and the variants of RS·(·) in one group, respectively. A dashed arrow from A to
B means that rule A implies some rule in B; while a plain arrow means that A implies all rules in B (e.g. AA
2Also, it is easy to see that Env does not have a dominant strategy for his specification (details are in Appendix). So,
considering dominant strategies as best-effort strategies would not lead to a solution for this example. To find a solution, we
need to take into account the objectives of the other players.
3The interested reader can find a detailed explanation for all those claims in the appendix.
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AA AG∨,∧ Coop
RS∃,∀(NE, SPE,Dom)Win
Figure 1: Comparison of synthesis rules.
implies AG∧ but not AG∨; while Win implies both rules.) An absence of path means that A does not imply
any variant of B. Thus the figure explains which approaches yield solutions more often, by abstracting away
the precise variants. The following theorem states the correctness of our diagram; the appendix contains
detailed proofs between all pairs of rules.
Theorem 2. The implication relations of Fig. 1 hold.
In the controller synthesis framework using two-player games between a controller and its environment,
some works advocate the use of environment objectives which the environment can guarantee against any
controller [7]. Under this assumption, Win-under-Hyp implies AA:
Lemma 1. Let G = 〈A, φ1, φ2〉 be a two-player game. If player 2 has a winning strategy for φ2 and Win-
under-Hyp has a solution, then AA has a solution.
We now consider the robustness of the profiles synthesized using the above rules. An AA-winning strategy
profile σP is robust in the following sense: The set of AA-winning profiles is rectangular, i.e. any combination
of AA-winning strategies independently chosen for each player, is an AA-winning profile. Second, if one
replaces any subset of strategies in AA-winning profile σP by arbitrary admissible strategies, the objectives
of all the other players still hold. Formally, a rectangular set of strategy profiles is a set that is a Cartesian
product of sets of strategies, given for each player. A synthesis rule is rectangular if the set of strategy profiles
satisfying the rule is rectangular. The RS rules require a specific definition since player 1 has a particular
role: we say that RS∀,∃(γ) is rectangular if given for any strategy σ1 witnessing the rule, the set of strategy
profiles (σ2, . . . , σn) ∈ Σ
γ
G,σ1
such that G, σ1, . . . , σn |= φ1 is rectangular. We show that apart from AA, only
Win and RS∀(Dom) are rectangular among the other rules:
Theorem 3. We have 1. Rule AA is rectangular; and for all games G, AA-winning strategy profile σP , coali-
tion C ⊆ P, if σ′C ∈ AdmC(G), then G, σ−C , σ
′
C |=
∧
i∈−C φi. 2. The rules Win and RS
∀(Dom) are rectangu-
lar; the rules Coop, AG∨, AG∧,
RS∃(NE, SPE,Dom), and RS∀(NE, SPE) are not rectangular.
6 Algorithm for Assume-Admissible Synthesis
s1 s2 s3
Figure 2: Game G with two players P =
{1, 2}. Player 1 controls the round states, and
has objective GFs2, and player 2 controls the
square state and has objective GFs1.
In this section, we recall the characterization of the outcomes
of admissible strategy profiles given in [4], and we derive al-
gorithms for the AA rule. We use the game of Fig. 2 as a
running example for this section. Clearly, none of the play-
ers of this game has a winning strategy for his own objec-
tive when not taking into account the objective of the other
player, but, as we will see, both players have an admissible
and winning strategy against the admissible strategies of the
other player, and so the AA rule applies.
The notion of value associated to the states of a game
plays an important role in the characterization of admissible
strategies and their outcomes [2, 4]. Fix a game G. A state s
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has value 1 for player i, written Vali(s) = 1, if player i has a winning strategy from s; Vali(s) = −1 if for all
strategy profiles σP ∈ ΣP , OutG,s(σP ) does not satisfy φi; and otherwise Vali(s) = 0. A player j decreases
its own value in history h if there is a position k such that Valj(hk) > Valj(hk+1) and hk ∈ Sj . We proved in
[4], that admissible strategies do not decrease their own values. Let us call such strategies value-preserving.
In fact, if the current state has value 1, there is a winning strategy which stays within the winning region;
if the value is 0, then although other players may force the play into states of value −1, a good strategy for
player i will not do this by itself.
Lemma 2 ([4, Lem. 1]). For all games G, players i, and histories ρ, if last(ρ) ∈ Si and σi ∈ Admi then
Vali(δ(last(ρ), σi(ρ))) = Vali(last(ρ)).
For player i, let us define the sets Vi,x = {s | Vali(s) = x} for x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, which partition S. We define
the set of value-preserving edges for player i as Ei = {(s, a) ∈ S × Act | s ∈ Si ⇒ Vali(δ(s, a)) = Vali(s)}.
Observe that value-preserving strategies for player i are exactly those respecting Ei. In our running example
of Fig. 2, it should be clear that any strategy that chooses a transition that goes to s3 is not admissible nor
for Player 1 neither for Player 2, as by making this choice both players are condemned to lose their own
objective while their other choices leave a chance to win; so the choice of going to s3 would decrease their
own value. So, we can already conclude that Player 2 always chooses s2 7→ s1, his only admissible strategy.
Not all value-preserving strategies are admissible: for Mu¨ller objectives, staying inside the winning region
does not imply the objective. Moreover, in states of value 0, admissible strategies must visit states where
other players can “help” satisfy the objective. Formally, help states for player i are other players’ states with
value 0 and at least two different successors of value 0 or 1. Let Hi = {s ∈ S\Si | Vali(s) = 0∧∃s′ 6= s′′. s′ ∈
δ(s,Act) ∧ s′′ ∈ δ(s,Act) ∧ Vali(s
′) ≥ 0 ∧ Vali(s
′′) ≥ 0}. Given this, the following lemma, adapted from [4],
characterizes the outcomes of admissible strategies. We denote by G(Ei) the set of runs that respect Ei, i.e.
G(
∨
(s,a)∈Ei
s ∧ X(δ(s, a))).
Lemma 3. For all games G, and players i, OutG ∩ Φi = OutG(Admi,Σ−i), where Φi = G(Ei) ∧ (GF(Vi,1)⇒
φi) ∧ (GF(Vi,0)⇒ φi ∨ GF(Hi)).
In our running example of Fig. 2, a strategy of Player 1 which, after some point, always chooses s1 7→ s1 is
dominated by strategies that chose infinitely often s1 7→ s2. This is a corollary of the lemma above. Indeed,
while all those strategies only visit states with value 0 (and so do not decrease the value for Player 1), the
strategy that always chooses s1 7→ s1 has an outcome which is loosing for Player 1 while the other strategies
are compatible with outcomes that are winning for Player 1. So, outcome of admissible strategies for
Player 1 that always visit states with values 0, also visits s2 infinitely often. Using the fact that strategies
are value-preserving and the last observation, we can now conclude that both players have (admissible)
winning strategies against the admissible strategies of the other players. For instance when Player 1 always
chooses to play s1 7→ s2, he wins against the admissible strategies of Player 2.
Note that Φi can be decomposed into a safety condition Si = G(Ei) and a prefix independent condition
Mi = (GF(Vi,1) ⇒ φi) ∧ (GF(Vi,0) ⇒ (φi ∨ GF(Hi)) which can be expressed by a Mu¨ller condition described
by a circuit of polynomial size.
For player i, we let Ωi = OutG(Admi)∧ (OutG(Adm−i)⇒ φi), which describes the outcomes of admissible
strategies of player i, which satisfy objective φi under the hypothesis that they are compatible with other
players’ admissible strategies. In fact, it follows from [4] that Ωi captures the outcomes of AA-winning
strategies for player i.
Lemma 4. A player i strategy is AA-winning iff it is winning for objective Ωi.
Objective Ωi is not directly expressible as a Mu¨ller condition, since Φi and
∧
j Φj contain safety parts.
Nevertheless, the information whether G(Ei), or G(∪j 6=iEj) has been violated can be encoded in the state
space. Formally, for each player i, we define game G′i by taking the product of G with {⊤, 0,⊥}; that is,
the states are S × {⊤, 0,⊥}, and the initial state (sinit, 0). The transitions are defined as for G for the first
component; while from state (s, 0), any action a outside Ei leads to (δ(s, a),⊥), and any action a outside Ej ,
j 6= i, leads to (δ(s, a),⊤). The second component is absorbing at ⊥,⊤. We now rewrite the condition Ωi
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for G′i as Ω
′
i =
(
GF(S× {0}) ∧M ′i ∧ (∧j 6=iM
′
j ⇒ φ
′
i)
)
∨ (GF(S× {⊤}) ∧M ′i), where M
′
i is the set of runs of G
′
i
whose projections to G are in Mi, and similarly for φ
′
i.
Now, checking AA-synthesis is reduced to solving games with Mu¨ller conditions. Moreover, we also obtain
a polynomial-time algorithm when all objectives are Bu¨chi conditions, by showing that Ω′i is expressible by
a parity condition with four colors.
Theorem 4. AA-synthesis in multiplayer games is PSPACE-complete, and P-complete for Bu¨chi objectives.
Player i wins for objective Ωi in G iff he wins for objective Ω
′
i in G
′
i.
7 Abstraction
We present abstraction techniques to compute assume-admissible strategy profiles following the abstract
interpretation framework [11]; see [18] for games. Abstraction is a crucial feature for scalability in practice,
and we show here that the AA rule is amenable to abstraction techniques. The problem is not directly
reducible to computing AA-winning strategies in abstract games obtained as e.g. in [13]; in fact, it can
be easily seen that the set of admissible strategies of an abstract game is incomparable with those of the
concrete game in general.
Overview. Informally, to compute an AA-winning strategy for player i, we construct an abstract game A′i
with objective Ω′i s.t. winning strategies of player i in A
′
i map to AA-winning strategies in G. To define A
′,
we re-visit the steps of the algorithm of Section 6 by defining approximations computed on the abstract state
space. More precisely, we show how to compute under- and over-approximations of the sets Vx,k, namely
V x,k and V x,k, using fixpoint computations on the abstract state space only. We then use these sets to define
approximations of the value preserving edges (Ek and Ek) and those of the help states (Hk and Hk). These
are then combined to define objective Ω′k s.t. if player k wins the abstract game for Ω
′
k, then he wins the
original game for Ω′k, and thus has an AA-winning strategy.
Abstract Games. Consider G = 〈A, (φi)i∈P 〉 with A = 〈P , (Si)i∈P , sinit, (Acti)i∈P , δ〉 where each φi is a
Mu¨ller objective given by a family of sets of states (Fi)i∈P . Let Sa =
⊎
i∈P S
a
i denote a finite set, namely
the abstract state space. A concretization function γ : Sa 7→ 2S is a function such that: 1. the abstract states
partitions the state space:
⊎
sa∈Sa γ(s
a) = S, 2. it is compatible with players’ states: for all players i and
sa ∈ Sai , γ(s
a) ⊆ Si. We define the corresponding abstraction function α : S → Sa where α(s) is the unique
state sa s.t. s ∈ γ(sa). We also extend α, γ naturally to sets of states; and to histories, by replacing each
element of the sequence by its image.
We further assume that γ is compatible with all objectives Fi in the sense that the abstraction of a set S
is sufficient to determine whether S ∈ Fi: for all i ∈ P , for all S, S′ ⊆ S with α(S) = α(S′), we have
S ∈ Fi ⇔ S′ ∈ Fi. If the objective φi is given by a circuit, then the circuit for the corresponding abstract
objective φai is obtained by replacing each input on state s by α(s). We thus have ρ ∈ φi if, and only if,
α(ρ) ∈ φai .
The abstract transition relation ∆a induced by γ is defined by: (sa, a, ta) ∈ ∆a ⇔ ∃s ∈ γ(sa), ∃t ∈
γ(ta), t = δ(s, a). We write post∆(s
a, a) = {ta ∈ Sa | ∆(sa, a, ta)}, and post∆(s
a,Act) = ∪a∈Actpost∆(s
a, a).
For each coalition C ⊆ P , we define a game in which players C play together against coalition −C;
and the former resolves non-determinism in ∆a. Intuitively, the winning region for C in this abstract
game will be an over-approximation of the original winning region. Given C, the abstract arena AC is
〈{C,−C}, (SC , S−C), α(sinit),
(ActC ,Act−C), δ
a,C〉, where SC =
(⋃
i∈C S
a
i
)
∪
(⋃
i∈P S
a
i × Acti
)
, S−C =
⋃
i6∈C S
a
i ; and ActC =
(⋃
i∈C Acti
)
∪Sa
and Act−C =
⋃
i∈−C Acti. The relation δ
a,C is given by: if sa ∈ Sa, then δa,C(sa, a) = (sa, a). If
(sa, a) ∈ Sa ×Act and ta ∈ Sa satisfies (sa, a, ta) ∈ ∆a then δa,C((sa, a), ta) = ta; while for (sa, a, ta) 6∈ ∆a, the
play leads to an arbitrarily chosen state ua with ∆(sa, a, ua). Thus, from states (sa, a), coalition C chooses
a successor ta.
We extend γ to histories of AC by first removing states of (Sai × Acti); and extend α by inserting these
intermediate states. Given a strategy σ of player k in AC , we define its concretization as the strategy γ(σ)
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of G that, at any history h of G, plays γ(σ)(h) = σ(α(h)). We write WinD(AC , φak) for the states of S
a from
which the coalition D has a winning strategy in AC for objective φak, with D ∈ {C,−C}. Informally, it
is easier for coalition C to achieve an objective in AC than in G, that is, WinC(AC , φak) over-approximates
WinC(A, φk):
Lemma 5. If the coalition C has a winning strategy for objective φk in G from s then it has a winning
strategy for φak in A
C from α(s).
Value-Preserving Strategies. We now provide under- and over-approximations for value-preserving
strategies for a given player. We start by computing approximations V k,x and V k,x of the sets Vk,x, and then
use these to obtain approximations of the value-preserving edges Ek. Fix a game G, and a player k. Let us
define the controllable predecessors for player k as CPREAP\{k},k(X) = {s
a ∈ Sak | ∃a ∈ Actk, post∆(s
a, a) ⊆
X} ∪ {sa ∈ SaP\{k} | ∀a ∈ Act−k, post∆(s
a, a) ⊆ X}. We let
V k,1 = Win{k}(A
{k}, φak), V k,−1 = Win∅(A
∅,¬φak),
V k,0 = WinP\{k}(A
P\{k},¬φa,k) ∩WinP(AP , φak),
V k,1 = Win{k}(A
P\{k}, φak), V k,−1 = Win∅(A
P ,¬φak)
V k,0 = νX.
(
CPREAP\{k},k(X ∪ V k,1 ∪ V k,−1) ∩ F
)
,
where F = WinP\{k}(A
{k},¬φak) ∩WinP(A
∅, φak).
The last definition uses the νX.f(X) operator which is the greatest fixpoint of f . These sets define approxi-
mations of the sets Vk,x. Informally, this follows from the fact that to define e.g. V k,1, we use the game A{k},
where player k resolves itself the non-determinism, and thus has more power than in G. In contrast, for V k,1,
we solve AP\{k} where the adversary resolves non-determinism. We state these properties formally:
Lemma 6. For all players k and x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, γ(V k,x) ⊆ Vk,x ⊆ γ(V k,x).
We thus have ∪xγ(V k,x) = S (as ∪xVk,x = S) but this is not the case for V k,x; so let us define V =
∪j∈{−1,0,1}V k,j . We now define approximations of Ek based on the above sets.
Ek = {(sa, a) ∈ Sa × Act | sa ∈ Sak ⇒ ∃x, s
a ∈ V k,x, post∆(s
a, a) ∩ ∪l≥xV k,l 6= ∅},
Ek = {(s
a, a) ∈ Sa × Act | sa ∈ Sak ⇒ ∃x, s
a ∈ V k,x, post∆(s
a, a) ⊆ ∪l≥xV k,l} ∪ {(s
a, a) | sa 6∈ V }.
Intuitively, Ek is an over-approximation of Ek, and Ek under-approximates Ek when restricted to states
in V (notice that Ek contains all actions from states outside V ). In fact, our under-approximation will be
valid only inside V ; but we will require the initial state to be in this set, and make sure the play stays
within V . We show that sets Ek and Ek provide approximations of value-preserving strategies.
Lemma 7. For all games G, and players k, Stratk(Ek) ⊆ γ(Stratk(Ek)), and if sinit ∈ γ(V ), then ∅ 6=
γ(Stratk(Ek)) ⊆ Stratk(Ek).
Abstract Synthesis of AA-winning strategies. We now describe the computation of AA-winning strate-
gies in abstract games. Consider game G and assume sets Ei, Ei are computed for all players i. Roughly,
to compute a strategy for player k, we will constrain him to play only edges from Ek, while other players j
will play in Ej . By Lemma 7, any strategy of player k maps to value-preserving strategies in the original
game, and all value-preserving strategies for other players are still present. We now formalize this idea,
incorporating the help states in the abstraction.
We fix a player k. We construct an abstract game in which winning for player k implies that player k has an
effective AA-winning strategy in G. We also defineA′k = 〈{{k},−k}, (S
′a
k, S
′a
−k∪S
′a×Act), α(sinit), (Actk,Act−k), δAk〉,
where S′
a
= Sa × {⊥, 0,⊤}; thus we modify AP\{k} by taking the product of the state space with {⊤, 0,⊥}.
Intuitively, as in Section 6, initially the second component is 0, meaning that no player has violated the
value-preserving edges. The component becomes ⊥ whenever player k plays an action outside of Ek; and ⊤
if another player j plays outside Ej . We extend γ to A′k by γ((s
a, x)) = γ(sa) × {x}, and extend it to
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histories of A′k by first removing the intermediate states S
′a × Act. We thus see A′k as an abstraction of A
′
of Section 6.
In order to define the objective of A′k, let us first define approximations of the help states Hk, where we
write ∆(sa,Act, ta) to mean ∃a ∈ Act,∆(sa, a, ta).
Hk = {sa ∈ V k,0 \ Sak | ∃t
a, ua ∈ V k,0 ∪ V k,1. ∆(sa,Act, ta) ∧∆(sa,Act, ua)}
Hk = {s
a ∈ V k,0 \ S
a
k | ∃a 6= b ∈ Act, post∆(s
a, a) ∩ post∆(s
a, b) = ∅,
post∆(s
a, a) ∪ post∆(s
a, b) ⊆ V k,0 ∪ V k,1}.
We define the following approximations of the objectives M ′k and Ω
′
k in A
′
k.
M ′k = (GF(V k,1)⇒ φ
a
k) ∧
(
GF(V k,0)⇒ (φak ∨ GF(Hk))
)
,
M
′
k = (GF(V k,1)⇒ φ
a
k) ∧
(
GF(V k,0)⇒ (φ
a
k ∨ GF(Hk))
)
,
Ω′k =
(
GF(Sa × {0}) ∧M ′k ∧
(∧
j 6=kM
′
j ⇒ φak
))
∨ (GF(Sa × {⊤}) ∧M ′k) .
Theorem 5. For all games G, and players k, if sinit ∈ V , and player k has a winning strategy in A′k for
objective Ω′k, then he has a winning strategy in G
′
k for Ωk; and thus a AA-winning strategy in G.
Now, if Theorem 5 succeeds to find an AA-winning strategy for each player k, then the resulting strategy
profile is AA-winning.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have introduced a novel synthesis rule, called the assume admissible synthesis, for the
synthesis of strategies in non-zero sum n players games played on graphs with omega-regular objectives.
We use the notion of admissible strategy, a classical concept from game theory, to take into account the
objectives of the other players when looking for winning strategy of one player. We have compared our
approach with other approaches such as assume guarantee synthesis and rational synthesis that target the
similar scientific objectives. We have developed worst-case optimal algorithms to handle our synthesis rule
as well as dedicated abstraction techniques. As future works, we plan to develop a tool prototype to support
our assume admissible synthesis rule.
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A Complements on Synthesis Rules (Section 3)
We give the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. For all AA-winning strategy profile σP , G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi.
Proof. Let σP be a strategy profile witness of AA. Let i be a player, we have that σ−i ∈ Adm−i(G), because
by condition 1, for all j 6= i, σj ∈ Admj(G). Then by condition 2 we have that G, σP |= φi. Since this is true
for all players i, we have that G, σP |=
∧
i∈P φi.
The following example shows that AA-winning strategies must be admissible themselves for Thm. 1 to
hold.
s1
φ1, φ2
s2
s3
⊥
φ1
Figure 3: Illustration of the necessity of Condition 1 in the definition of Assume-Admissible Synthesis.
Player 1 controls circles and player 2 squares.
Example 1. In AA, the profile of strategy must be composed of admissible strategies only. This is necessary
otherwise the players may make assumptions on each other which are not satisfied. This is illustrated by
the example of Figure 3 in which two players have reachability objectives φ1 and φ2 respectively. The states
labeled by φi are the target states for the corresponding objective. Admissible strategies are shown in thick
edges. Now, the player 2 strategy that chooses the dashed edge from s2 satisfies Condition 2 of AA, since
s2 is not reachable under admissible strategies of player 1. Similarly, the player 1 strategy that chooses the
dashed edge from s1 satisfies Condition 2 of AA since the thick edges lead back to a state satisfying φ1. But
then the resulting profile is such that none of the two players win.
We explain why the pair of strategies (σ1, σ2) is a solution for the synthesis rules Coop, AG, RS
∃(NE, SPE):
• Rule Coop: the outcome of (σ1, σ2) is ”Env emits r1, then Sched emits q1, Env emits r2, then Sched
waits one round and emits q2, and repeat.” This outcome is a model for both φSched and φEnv.
• Rules AG∧,∨: the two rules coincide as we have only two players. When both players follow (σ1, σ2),
we know that the outcome is a model for both φSched and φEnv. We must in addition verify that
Out(σ1) |= φEnv → φSched and that Out(σ2) |= φSched → φEnv. This is the case as either the outcome
of the game between the two players is ”Env emits r1, then Sched emits q1, Env emits r2, then Sched
waits one round and emits q2, and repeat”, or it is not but then player 1 switches to strategy σˆ1 and
this forces outcomes that falsify φEnv. The argument is similar to justify that Out(σ2) |= φSched → φEnv.
• Rules RS∃(NE, SPE,Dom): for the existential version of rational synthesis, we consider that Sched
(player 1) plays the role of the system. We must then prove that (σ1, σ2) is such that φSched is satisfied
and σ2 is stable for NE,SPE, and Dom. This is the case because Out(σ1, σ2) is a model for φSched, so it
satisfies the specification of the scheduler. Furthermore, it satisfies the specification of the environment,
and so the environment has no incentive to deviate: σ2 is stable for NE. It is also stable for SPE as
any deviation of the environment triggers strategy σˆ1 for the scheduler and σˆ2 for the environment,
as a consequence, there is no incentive for environment to deviate from σˆ2 as Out(σˆ1) |= ¬φEnv. It is
stable for Dom because σ2 is winning under σ1.
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We explain why the pair of strategies σ1 is a solution for the rules Win-under-Hyp and RS
∀(NE, SPE):
• Rule Win-under-Hyp: we have seen above that Out(σ1) |= φEnv → φSched and so σ1 is a solution for
Win-under-Hyp.
• Rules RS∀(NE, SPE,Dom): against σ1, the only strategies for the environment that are stable for NE,
SPE, Dom are those that make sure that the outcome is equal to ”Env emits r1, then Sched emits q1,
Env emits r2, then Sched waits one round and emits q2, and repeat.” Indeed, any strategy that would
deviate from that outcome would trigger the execution of σˆ1 for the scheduler and the outcome would
then be losing for the environment making a deviation toward σ2 profitable for instance.
Absence of dominant strategies Let us now convince the reader that Env has no dominant strategy
for his specification. Indeed, it is easy to see that if there are dominant strategies then all admissible strategies
must be dominant. Now, take two strategies in Adm(φEnv) that behaves the same with the exception that
the first strategy when a request is granted (qi is true), directly issue another request ri, for i ∈ {1, 2}, while
the second strategy waits one additional turn to issue the new request ri. It is easy to see that none of the
two strategies dominate the other one, as the Sched can adapt his own strategy to make the first strategy
win and the second loose, and the other way around.
B Comparison of the Synthesis Rules (Section 5)
In this section, we detail the comparison of the synthesis notions we consider. We adopt the following
notation: an implication A⇒ B between two notions A and B means that B has a solution whenever A has
one. Note that this does not always imply inclusion between the witnessing strategy profiles. The proof of
Theorem 2, will be decomposed in several lemmas.
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Remark 1. We have RS∃(SPE) ⇒ RS∃(NE) and RS∀(NE) ⇒ RS∀(SPE) because any subgame perfect equi-
librium is also a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, in the definition of the rules RS, the conditions for RS∀ are
stronger than for RS∃, so RS∀(SPE)⇒ RS∃(SPE), RS∀(NE)⇒ RS∃(NE) and RS∀(Dom)⇒ RS∃(Dom).
Lemma 8. Win ⇒ AA⇒ Coop⇒ RS∃(SPE) and Win⇒ AG∨ ⇒ AG∧ ⇒ Coop,
Proof. Win ⇒ AA This holds because winning strategies are always admissible [2], therefore a profile witness
of Win satisfies condition 1 and 2 of the definition of assume-admissible.
AA⇒ Coop This holds by Theorem 1.
Coop⇒ RS∃(SPE) Note that in order for RS to make sense we must have sys ∈ P . Assume Coop has a
solution and let σP be a profile of strategy such that for all player i, σP |= φi.
We define a strategy profile σ′i, that follows the path ρ = OutG(σi) when possible (that is: if h is a
prefix of ρ then play act|h|(ρ)) and if not follows a subgame perfect equilibrium: that is, we select for each
state s a subgame perfect equilibrium σsP , there always exist one for Borel games (so in particular for Muller
games) [29, Theorem 3.15]; then if h is not a prefix of ρ, let j be the last index such that h≤j = ρ≤j and we
define σ′P(h) = σ
hj+1
P (h≥j+1).
Let h be a history. If h is a prefix of ρ then the objective of each player is satisfied by following σ′i ◦ h so
none of them can gain by changing its strategy, therefore it is a Nash equilibrium from last(h). If h is not
a prefix of ρ then by definition of σ′i, players follow a subgame-perfect equilibrium since h deviated from ρ,
so in particular σ′i ◦ h is a Nash equilibrium from last(h). Moreover the objective of the system is satisfied.
Therefore σP is a solution to RS(SPE).
Win⇒ AG∨ Let σP such that for each player i, σi is winning for φi. The first condition in the definition
of AG∨ is satisfied because for all player i, OutG(σP ) satisfies φi. The second condition is satisfied because
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for all strategy σ′−i, we have that OutG(σi, σ
′
−i) satisfies φi, so in particular it satisfies (
∨
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi).
Hence σP is a solution for AG
∨.
AG∨ ⇒ AG∧ This holds because the second condition in the definition of these rules is stronger for AG∨.
AG∧ ⇒ Coop This implication holds simply because of the condition 1 in the definition of assume-
guarantee, which corresponds to the definition of Cooperative synthesis.
Lemma 9. For all γ ∈ {NE, SPE,Dom}, Win ⇒ RS∀(γ), RS∀(Dom) 6⇒ RS∀(NE) and RS∃(Dom) ⇒
RS∃(SPE).
Proof. Win ⇒ RS∀(γ) Let σP be a strategy profile such that for each player i, σi is winning for φi.
We first show that ΣγG,σ1 is not empty. For γ ∈ {NE, SPE} this is because there always exist a subgame
perfect equilibrium for Borel games (so in particular for Muller games) [29, Theorem 3.15] and a subgame
perfect equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium. For γ = Dom, note that by definition of dominant strategies,
winning strategies are dominant, so ΣDomG,σ1 contains at least σ−1.
Let σ′−1 be a strategy profile for P \ {1}. Since σ1 is a winning we have that G, σ1, σ
′
−1 |= φ1. Therefore
σ1 is a solution for RS
∀(γ).
RS∃(Dom)⇒ RS∃(SPE) Let σP be a witness for RS
∃(Dom). We define a strategy profile σ′P such that
σ′i follows σi on all histories compatible with σi (that is if h prefix of ρ ∈ OutG(σi) then σ
′
i(h) = σi(h)) and
outside of these histories follows a subgame perfect equilibria: there always exist one for Borel games (so in
particular for Muller games) [29, Theorem 3.15].
By definition of σ′P , the outcome OutG(σ
′
P) is the same than OutG(σP). Because σP is a witness for
RS∀(Dom), this outcome is winning for player 1.
It remains to show that σ′−1 is a subgame perfect equilibria. Let h be a history, i be a player different
from player 1, and σ′′i be a strategy for player i. We show that from h player i does not improve by switching
from σ′i to another strategy σ
′′
i , which will show that σ
′
P ◦ h is a Nash equilibrium from h.
If h is compatible with σi then σ
′
i coincide with σi from this history, so OutG(σ
′
i, σ−i) = OutG(σP). Since
σi is a dominant strategy, if G, σ
′′
i , σ−i |= φi then G, σi, σ−i |= φi and therefore this implies that OutG(σ
′
i, σ−i)
satisfy φi. This means that i does not improve by switching from σ
′
i to σ
′′
i .
If h is not compatible with σi, then σ
′
i plays according to a subgame-perfect equilibria since the first
deviation. In particular, this strategy is a Nash equilibrium from h.
This shows that σ′−1 is a subgame perfect equilibrium and has σ
′
P |= φ1, this is a witness for RS
∃(SPE).
RS∀(Dom) 6⇒ RS∀(NE) Consider the example given in Figure 4. The strategy r for player 2 is dominant
and any strategy of player 3 is dominant. The outcome of these strategies always go to the bottom state
where φsys is satisfied. Therefore there is a solution to RS
∀(Dom).
However, we show that there is no solution to RS∀(NE). Consider the strategy profile (·, l, b), this is a
Nash equilibrium (even a subgame Nash equilibrium) since no player can improve his/her strategy. Note
that player 1 is losing for that profile, hence no strategy of player 1 can ensure that it will win for all Nash
equilibria.
In the example of Section 4, we saw that more strategy profiles satisfied the assume-guarantee condition
compared to assume-admissibility, including undesirable strategy profiles. We show that the rule AG∧ is
indeed more often satisfied than AA; while the rules AG∨, and AA are incomparable.
Lemma 10. We have AG∧ 6⇒ AA; AG∨ 6⇒ AA; AA 6⇒ AG∧ and AA 6⇒ AG∨.
Proof. AG∧ 6⇒ AA and AG∨ 6⇒ AA Consider the game represented in Figure 5. In this example, we have
Adm1 = Σ1. Therefore player 2 has no winning strategy against all admissible strategies of Adm2 (in
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s1 s2
φ1, φ2, φ3
φ2, φ3
φ3
l
r
b
a
Figure 4: Example showing that RS∀(Dom) 6⇒ RS∀(NE). Player 2 controls circle states, player 3 square
states and player 1 does not control any state.
s1
s2
s3
φ1
φ1, φ2
l
r
b
a
d
c
Figure 5: Example showing that AG 6⇒ AA. Player 1 controls circle states and player 2 square states.
particular the strategy of player 1 that plays r, makes player 2 lose). So AA fails. However, we do have AG∧
by the profile σ1 : s1 7→ l, σ2 : s2 7→ b, s3 7→ c. This profile also satisfies AG
∨ which is equivalent to AG∧ for
two player games.
AA 6⇒ AG∧ Consider the example of Figure 6. The profile where player 1 and player 2 plays to the right
is assume-admissible. However there is no solution to assume-guarantee synthesis: if player 1 and player 2
change their strategies to go to the state labeled φ1, φ2, then the condition G, σ3 |= (φ1 ∧ φ2) ⇒ φ3 is not
satisfied.
s1 φ1, φ2, φ3
s2
φ1, φ2
a
b
a
b
Figure 6: Example showing that AA 6⇒ AG∧. Player 1 controls circle states and player 2 square states;
player 3 does not control any state.
AA 6⇒ AG∨ We will provide a counter-example to show our claim. Note that we need strictly more than
two players since otherwise AG∨ is equivalent to AG∧, and we have just shown that AA implies AG∧.
Consider the game with three players in Fig. 7. Define the following objectives: φ1 = GF(s4 ∨ s7),
φ2 = GF(s4 ∨ s6), φ3 = true, where φi is player i’s objective. These are actually reachability objectives since
the game ends in absorbing states.
Now, action b is dominated at states s2 and s3 for player 2. Thus player 1 has a AA-winning strategy
which consists in taking a at s1. Player 2 has a winning strategy in the game (taking a at both states).
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Player 3 has a AA-winning strategy too since actions b are eliminated for player 2. Therefore, there is an
AA-winning strategy profile which ends in s4.
On the other hand, there is no AG∨ profile. In fact, player 1 has no winning strategy to ensure φ2∨φ3 ⇒
φ1, which is equivalent to φ1 since φ3 = true.
s1 s3 s4
s5s2
s6 s7
111
001
011 101
a a
b
b
a
b
Figure 7: Example showing that AA 6⇒ AG∨. Player 1 controls circle states and player 2 square states;
player 3 does not control any state. At each absorbing state, the given Boolean vector represents the set of
players for which the state is winning.
Lemma 11. For two player games, AA⇒ AG∧.
Proof. Assume G is a two player game and consider strategy profile (σ1, σ2) witness of AA. Note that if
player j decreases its own value at position k then its value for h≤k+1 will be smaller or equal to 0 which
means player j has no winning strategy from this history. By determinacy of turn-based zero-sum games,
player 3− j has a winning strategy for ¬φj . Therefore we can adjust the strategies (σ1, σ2) such that if there
is a player j that decreases its own value, the other player will make it lose. We write (σ′1, σ
′
2) the strategies
thus defined and we will show that they form a solution of Assume-Guarantee.
Let ρ be the outcome of the strategy profile (σ′1, σ
′
2). We can show that ρ is also the outcome of (σ1, σ2).
First we recall that an admissible strategy does not decrease its own value (Lemma 2). Therefore each σ′i is
identical to σi on the run ρ. By Theorem 1, ρ satisfies φ1 ∧ φ2.
Let σ′′1 be an arbitrary strategy profile for 1, and consider ρ
′ = OutG(σ
′′
1 , σ
′
2). We show that ρ
′ |= φ1 ⇒ φ2.
Note that player 2 cannot be the first to decrease its value during ρ′ since it behave according to σ2 has long
has there are no devition, and σ2 is admissible and admissible strategies do not decrease their own values.
• If player 1 decreases its value during ρ′, player 2 will play to make him lose and ρ′ 6|= φ1. As a
consequence ρ′ |= φ1 ⇒ φ2.
• Otherwise no player decreases its own value during ρ′. We assume that ρ′ |= φ1 and show that ρ′ |= φ2.
Since ρ′ |= φ1, by Lemma 13, there is a strategy τ ′′1 which is admissible and compatible with ρ
′. Since
ρ′ is an outcome of σ′2, and of τ
′′
1 , we have OutG(τ
′′
1 , σ2) = ρ
′. Now, since τ ′′1 is admissible and by the
fact that σ2 satisfies the condition 2 of AA, we obtain ρ
′ |= φ2, which proves the property.
We can show the same property replacing the roles of player 1 and player 2, thus showing that the profile is
solution of AG∧.
To prove that there is no implication for the edges that are not in the diagram of Figure 1, it remains to
be shown that:
Lemma 12. AA 6⇒ Win, AG∨ 6⇒ Win, Coop 6⇒ AA, Coop 6⇒ AG∧, Coop 6⇒ RS∃(Dom), and for all
γ ∈ {NE, SPE,Dom}, RS∃,∀(γ) 6⇒ Coop.
Proof. AA 6⇒Win Towards a contradiction assume AA⇒Win, then since we have Win ⇒ AG∧ (Lemma 8),
we would have AA⇒ AG∧ but this contradicts Lemma 10.
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AG∨ 6⇒Win Towards a contradiction assume AG∨ ⇒ Win, then since we have Win ⇒ AA (Lemma 8),
we would have AG∨ ⇒ AA but this contradicts Lemma 10.
Coop 6⇒ AA In Figure 5, we have an example of a game where there is no solution for AA (see the proof
of Lemma 10 for details), however there is a solution for Coop: (l, b).
Coop 6⇒ AG∧ Consider the example of Figure 8. There is a solution for Coop: player 1 plays a. However
there is no solution for AG∧: player 2 has no strategy to ensure that φ1 =⇒ φ2.
Coop 6⇒ RS∃(Dom) Consider the example of Figure 9. This example has a solution for Coop, for instance
(l, ac) or (r, bd). However player 2 has no dominant strategy: l looses against bd so it is dominated by r, and
r looses against ac so it is dominated by l. Therefore RS∃(Dom) has no solution.
1 φ1, φ2
φ1
a
b
Figure 8: Example showing that
Coop 6⇒ AG∧. Player 1 controls
the circle state.
2
3
3
φ1, φ2, φ3
∅
φ1, φ2, φ3
l
r
a
b
c
d
Figure 9: Example showing that Coop 6⇒
RS∃(Dom). Player 2 controls circle states,
player 3 square states and player 1 does not
control any state.
2
φ1
a
Figure 10: Two-player
game showing that
RS∃,∀(γ) 6⇒ Coop.
Player 2 controls the
circle state but has no
choice.
RS∃,∀(γ) 6⇒ Coop Consider the example of Figure 10. There is no solution for Coop: player 2 can never
win. However there is a solution for any concept in RS∃,∀(γ): player 1 wins against any of the strategy
satisfying these concepts since the only possible outcome is winning for him.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 1
We now give the proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1. Let G = 〈A, φ1, φ2〉 be a two-player game. If player 2 has a winning strategy for φ2 and Win-
under-Hyp has a solution, then AA has a solution.
Proof. Assume that σw2 is a winning strategy for φ2 and let σ1, σ2 be a solution of Win-under-Hyp. We
have that ∀σ′2. σ1, σ
′
2 |= φ2 ⇒ φ1 and ∀σ
′
1. σ
′
1, σ2 |= φ1 ⇒ φ2. Since σ
w
2 is a winning strategy, all admissible
strategies of player 2 are winning. Then, for all σ′2 ∈ Adm2, we have G, σ1, σ
′
2 |= φ2 and because ∀σ
′
2, σ1, σ
′
2 |=
φ2 ⇒ φ1, we also have that G, σ1, σ′2 |= φ1. If σ1 is dominated, there exists a non-dominated strategy σ
a
1 that
dominates it [2, Thm. 11], otherwise we take σa1 = σ1. In both cases σ
a
1 is admissible. As σ1 is dominated by
σa1 , G, σ1, σ
′
2 |= φ1 implies G, σ
a
1 , σ
′
2 |= φ1. This shows that the condition ∀σ
′
2 ∈ Adm2(G). G, σ
a
1 , σ
′
2 |= φ1 is
satisfied. Since σw2 is winning, it is admissible and we also have ∀σ
′
1 ∈ Adm1(G). G, σ
′
1, σ
w
2 |= φ2. Therefore
all conditions of Assume-Admissible are satisfied by (σa1 , σ
w
2 ).
We now prove Theorem 3.
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Theorem 3. We have 1. Rule AA is rectangular; and for all games G, AA-winning strategy profile σP , coali-
tion C ⊆ P, if σ′C ∈ AdmC(G), then G, σ−C , σ
′
C |=
∧
i∈−C φi. 2. The rules Win and RS
∀(Dom) are rectangu-
lar; the rules Coop, AG∨, AG∧,
RS∃(NE, SPE,Dom), and RS∀(NE, SPE) are not rectangular.
Proof. AA is rectangular If there is no solution to AA, then the set of witness is empty, and therefore is
rectangular. If there is only one solution, then it is the Cartesian product of singletons and therefore also a
rectangular set.
Otherwise let σP and σ
′
P be two solutions of AA. Let i be a player of P , we show that σi, σ
′
−i is also a
solution of AA. We have that σi ∈ Adm(G) and for all j 6= i, σj ∈ Adm(G), because condition 1 holds for
σP and σ
′
P . Therefore condition 1 holds for σi, σ
′
−i. Similarly, ∀σ
′
−i ∈ Adm−i(G). G, σ
′
i, σi |= φi and for all
j 6= i, ∀σ′−j ∈ Adm−j(G). G, σ
′
j , σj |= φj , because condition 2 holds for σP and σ
′
P . Therefore condition 2
holds for σi, σ
′
−i and it is a witness of AA.
Let Σaai be the set of strategy σi such that there exists σ−i such that σi, σ−i is a witness of AA. We can
show that the set of witness of AA is the Cartesian product of the Σaai . We obviously have that the set of
solutions is included in
∏
i∈P Σ
aa
i . Let σP be a profile in
∏
i∈P Σ
aa
i , and σ
′
P a witness of AA. We can replace
for one i at a time, the strategy σ′i by σi in σ
′
P and by the small property we previously proved, the strategy
profile stays a solution of AA. Therefore σP is a solution of AA. This shows that the set of solutions is the
rectangular set
∏
i∈P Σ
aa
i .
σ′C ∈ AdmC(G)⇒ G, σ−C , σ
′
C |=
∧
i∈−C φi This claim follows from the definition of AA-winning strategy
profiles, since each strategy is winning against admissible strategies.
Now Consider any game G and fix a profile σP such that G, σP |=
∧
1≤i≤n φi.
Win Assume σP is solution to Win, then each σi is a winning strategy. Let σ
′
i be a strategy part of
another profile solution to Win. Then the strategy σ′i ensures φi against any strategy profile for −i. If
we replace σi by σ
′
i in the profile σP then the condition for Win are still satisfied. Thus the rule Win is
rectangular.
RS∀(Dom) Let σ1 be a solution of RS
∀(Dom). Let σ2, . . . , σn and σ
′
2, . . . , σ
′
n be profiles of Σ
Dom
G,σ1
such
that σ1, σ2, . . . , σn |= φ1 and σ1, σ′2, . . . , σ
′
n |= φ1. If we define a profile τ2, . . . , τn where each τi is either σi or
σ′i, then as each τi is dominant, we have σ1, τ2, . . . , τn |= φ1 because σ1 is a solution of RS
∀(Dom). Therefore
the profile belongs to ΣDomG,σ1 and makes σ1 win. This shows that the rule is rectangular.
RS∃(Dom) Consider the example of Figure 11. Since player 2 and player 3 are always winning, all their
strategies are dominant. There is only one strategy σ1 for player 1 since it controls no state. The profiles
(a, c) and (b, d) are strategies of ΣDomG,σ1 such that σ1 wins for φ1, but the profile (σ1, a, d) does not make φ1
hold. The rule is therefore not rectangular.
2
3 φ1, φ2, φ3
φ1, φ2, φ3 φ2, φ3
a b
c d
Figure 11: Game with three players showing that
rule RS∃(Dom) is not rectangular. Here, player 1
controls no state; player 2 controls the square
state, and player 3 controls the round state.
2
3 φ1, φ2, φ3
φ1, φ2, φ3 φ1, φ3
a b
c d
Figure 12: Game with three players showing that
rule RS∀(NE) and RS∀(SPE) are not rectangular.
Player 1 controls no state, player 2 controls the
square state and player 3 the round state.
RS∀(NE) and RS∀(SPE) Consider the game represented in Figure 12. Player 1 has only one strategy σ1
and the other players have two possible strategies: a and b for player 2 and c and d for player 3. Since
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23 φ1, φ2, φ3
φ1, φ2, φ3 φ3
a b
c d
Figure 13: Game with three players showing
that rule RS∃(NE) and RS∃(SPE) are not rect-
angular. Player 1 controls no state, player 2
controls the square state and player 3 the round
state.
1
2 φ1, φ2
φ1, φ2
a b
c d
Figure 14: Game with two players showing that
rule AG∨ and AG∧ are not rectangular. Player 1
controls the round state and player 2 the square
state.
player 1 is always winning, σ1 is a solution for RS
∀(NE, SPE). The profiles (a, c) and (b, d) are two (subgame
perfect) Nash equilibria which make φ1 hold. However the profile (a, d) obtained by picking one strategy in
each profile, is no longer a Nash equilibrium (and so not a subgame perfect equilibrium). Therefore RS∀(NE)
and RS∀(SPE) are not rectangular.
RS∃(NE) and RS∃(SPE) Consider the game represented in Figure 13. Player 1 has only one strategy
and the other players have two possible strategies: a and b for player 2 and c and d for player 3. The profiles
(a, c) and (b, d) are two (subgame perfect) Nash equilibria which make φ1 hold. However the profile (a, d)
obtained by taking one strategy in each profile, is no longer winning for player 1. Therefore RS∃(NE) and
RS∃(SPE) are not rectangular.
Coop Once again, consider the game represented in Figure 13. The profiles (a, c) and (b, d) make all
players win, but the profile (a, d), is no longer winning for the player 1, so it is not a solution of Coop.
Therefore Coop is not rectangular.
AG∨ and AG∧ Consider the game represented in Figure 14. The profiles (a, c) and (b, d) make the two
players win. Since all possible outcome of the game satisfy the implications φ1 ⇒ φ2 and φ2 ⇒ φ1, both
profiles are solution to AG∨ and AG∧ (note that the two concepts coincide here because there are only two
players). However the profile (a, d) obtained by taking one strategy in each profile, is no longer winning for
the player 1. Therefore AG∨ and AG∧ are not rectangular.
C Complements on Algorithm for Assume-Admissible Synthesis
(Section 6)
In this section, we recall some detailed results on values and admissible strategies, and give the details of
the algorithm for assume-admissible synthesis.
C.1 Values of Histories and Admissibility
For the proofs, we actually need a more refined notion of value, which coincides with the notion defined in
the core of our paper for prefix-independent objectives. Let us give the formal definition from [2].
We fix a game G. Given a history h, and a set of strategies Σ′i for player i, we write Σ
′
i(h) for the set of
strategies of Σ′i compatible with h, that is, the set of strategies σi such that h ∈ OutG(σi). We also write
Σ′(h) for
∏
i∈P Σ
′
i(h).
Definition 1 (Value [2]). Let Σ′ be a rectangular set of strategy profiles. The value of history h for player i
with respect to Σ′, written Vali(Σ
′, h), is given by:
• if every σP ∈ Σ′(h) is losing for player i then Vali(Σ′, h) = −1;
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• if there is a strategy of σi ∈ Σ′i(h) such that for all strategy profiles σ−i in Σ
′
−i(h), the profile (σi, σ−i)
is winning for player i then Vali(Σ
′, h) = 1;
• otherwise Vali(Σ′, h) = 0;
We use the shorthand notation Vali(h) = Vali(Σ, h). Notice that the value only depends on the last state
for prefix-independent objectives. We may thus write Vali(s) = Vali(h) for s = last(h); observe that this is
the notation we use in the core of the paper.
We noted in Lemma 2 that admissible strategies do not make the player’s value decrease. We prove here
that conversely, any winning run on which player i does not decrease its own value is compatible with an
admissible strategy of player i.
Lemma 13. Let i be a player, and ρ a history. If ρ |= φi and player i does not decrease its own value in any
prefix of ρ, then there exists a strategy profile (σi, σ−i) ∈ Admi×Σ−i such that ρ is the outcome of (σi, σ−i).
Proof. We define the strategies σi and σ−i to follow ρ when possible (if the current history is a prefix of
ρ, then proceed to the following state of ρ), and if a deviation has occurred in ρ, that is there is k such
that hk = ρk, hk+1 6= ρk+1, then starting from h≤k+1, σi follows a non-dominated strategies with respect to
Σ(hk+1) (Thanks to [2] and the fact that this set allows shifting [2] such a non-dominated strategies exists).
The run ρ is obviously an outcome of this profile. We now have to show that the strategy σi that we define
is admissible. According to [2, Lem. 9], it is enough to show that for every history h outcome of σi, the value
for player i with respect to {σi} × Σ−i is greater or equal to that of Σ.
Let h be a finite outcome of σi. We distinguish the case where h has deviated from ρ and the case where
it has not.
If a deviation has occurred, then σi follows a strategy non dominated with respect to Σ(h≤k+1) where k
is the last index where hk = ρk. By [2, Lem. 9], the value of {σi}×Σ−i(h) in h is greater or equal to that of
Σ(h≤k+1). Since Σ−i(h) ⊆ Σ−i(h≤k+1), the value of h with respect to {σi} × Σ−i(h) is greater or equal to
that with respect Σ(h). Note that by the definition of the value, the value of h with respect to a rectangular
set Σ′ is equal to that of h with respect to Σ′(h). Therefore the value of h with respect with {σi} × Σ is
greater or equal to that with respect to Σ.
If a deviation has not occurred then h is a prefix of ρ. The value of h with respect to Σ is greater or
equal to 0 since ρ is winning for φi. Then:
• if the value is 0, then as there is an outcome of σi after this history which is winning (the run ρ), the
value of σi is at least 0;
• if the value is 1, then we can show that from this state σi plays a winning strategy: if we stay along ρ,
the run is winning, if we deviate, the run goes to a state of value 1 (player i has not decreased its own
value and from a state of value 1 for player i, any action of the adversaries lead to a state of value 1),
and therefore σi revert to a winning strategy.
Therefore the property is satisfied by σi and it is admissible.
We now prove Lemma 3 characterizing the outcomes of admissible strategies. This result follows from [4],
but we adapt it to make the formulas Φi appear explicitly.
Lemma 3. For all games G, and players i, OutG ∩ Φi = OutG(Admi,Σ−i), where Φi = G(Ei) ∧ (GF(Vi,1)⇒
φi) ∧ (GF(Vi,0)⇒ φi ∨ GF(Hi)).
Proof. In [4, Lemma 6], an automaton A1i is defined such that A
1
i ∩OutG(Σ) = OutG(Admi,Σ−i). (Note that
a more general construction Ani was given in [4]; we only need the case n = 1 here.)
We now analyze further the language of A1i . The edges are those of G except for edges outside of Ei
(these edges are noted T in [4]), so the set of runs in A1i corresponds to OutG ∩ G(Ei). Now a run of A
1
i is
accepted if, and only if one the following condition is satisfied, writing VR(ρ) for the sequence (Val(ρi))i∈N:
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• VR(ρ) ∈ 0∗(−1)ω;
• VR(ρ) ∈ 0∗1ω and ρ |= φi;
• VR(ρ) ∈ 0ω and ρ |= φi or ρ |= GF(Hi).
Any run of OutG ∩ G(Ei) reaching some state of value −1 is necessarily losing; thus all successors also
have value −1. Similarly, because we removed edges where player i decreases its own value, once the runs
reaches a state of value 1, it never gets out of these states. Therefore runs of OutG ∩ G(Ei) have one of the
three forms: 0∗(−1)ω, 0∗1ω or 0ω.
Let ρ be a run that is accepted by A1i , it satisfies G(Ei) and:
• if ρ ends in the states of value −1 then it does not visit Vi,1 or Vi,0 infinitely often and thus belongs to
Φi;
• if ρ ends in the states of value 1, then by the acceptance condition it satisfies φi and thus belongs to
Φi;
• otherwise it stays in the states of value 0, then by the acceptance condition, either it satisfies φi or
GF(Hi) and thus belongs to Φi.
Now let ρ be a run that satisfies φi, it satisfies G(Ei) and therefore corresponds to a valid run of A1i .
• If ρ ends in the states of value −1 then condition VR(ρ) ∈ 0∗(−1)ω is satisfied, thus ρ is accepted by
A1i .
• If ρ ends in the states of value 1, then by definition of Φi it satisfies φi and condition VR(ρ) ∈ 0∗1ω
and ρ |= φi is satisfied, thus ρ is accepted by A1i .
• Otherwise it stays in the states of value 0, then by definition of Φi, either φi or GF(Hi) holds for ρ,
hence VR(ρ) ∈ 0ω and ρ |= φi or ρ |= GF(Hi) is satisfied, thus ρ is accepted by A1i .
This shows that Φ1 ∩ OutG = A1i ∩ OutG and by [4, Lemma 6], this equals Out(Admi,Σ−i).
C.2 Algorithm
We start by a characterization of games with AA-winning strategy profiles. An assume-admissible winning
strategy ensures its objective against all admissible strategies of other players; we formalize this in the
following lemma using values (see Definition 1).
Lemma 14. For all game G, there is an AA-winning strategy profile if, and only if for all players i,
Vali((Admj(G))j∈P , sinit) = 1.
Proof. By definition of the value we have for all player i, that:
Vali((Admi(G))i∈P , sinit) = 1 ⇔ ∃σi ∈ Admi(G). ∀σ−i ∈ Adm−i(G). G, σi, σ−i |= φi (1)
⇒ If σP is a witness for Assume-Admissible then for all players i, σi ∈ Admi(G) is such that for all
σ−i ∈ Adm−i(G), G, σi, σ−i |= φi. Hence by (1), for all players i, Vali((Admi(G))i∈P , sinit) = 1.
⇐ Assume that for all players i, Vali((Admi(G))i∈P , sinit) = 1. By (1) we have that for all players i, there
exist σi ∈ Admi(G) such that ∀σ−i ∈ Adm−i(G). G, σi, σ−i |= φi. Let σP be a strategy profile made of such
strategies σi. We have that for all player i, σi ∈ Admi(G) (condition 1 in the definition of Assume-Admissible)
and moreover for all σ′−i ∈ Adm−i(G), G, σi, σ
′
−i |= φi (condition 2 in the definition of Assume-Admissible).
Hence the strategy profile σP constitutes a solution to Assume-Admissible.
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The algorithm to synthesize AA-winning strategies uses procedures from [4], originally developed to
compute the outcomes that survive the iterative elimination of dominated strategies. More precisely, the
elimination procedure of [4] first computes the outcomes of admissible strategies; from this it deduces the
strategies that are not dominated when all players are restricted to admissible strategies, and their possible
outcomes; and this is repeated until the set of outcomes stabilizes. In the end, one obtains the set of the
runs that are the outcomes of strategy profiles that have survived this iterative elimination.
Here, we roughly consider the first iteration of the above procedure, and explicitly give algorithms to
actually synthesize strategies that are winning against admissible strategies.
We explain the proof of Lemma 4 which follows from [4].
Lemma 4. A player i strategy is AA-winning iff it is winning for objective Ωi.
Proof. It is shown in [4, Prop. 5] that a strategy of player i is a strategy of Σni which is winning from state s
against all strategies of Σn−i if, and only if, it is winning for objective Ω
n
i (s) (where Σ
n is the set of strategy
that remain after n step of elimination). The results immediately follows of the case n = 1.
We will now establish the correctness of the game G′i. Let us first formalize the correspondence between
G and G′i. We define relation ∼ ⊆ S × S
′: for all s ∈ S × {⊥, 0,⊤}, s ∼ (s, x). We extend this to runs by
ρ ∼ ρ′ iff for all i ∈ N, ρi ∼ ρ′i. In fact the relation defines a bijection:
Lemma 15. For any ρ ∈ OutG there is a unique ρ′ ∈ OutG′
i
such that ρ ∼ ρ′.
Proof. Assume towards a contradiction that we have ρ′ and ρ′′ such that ρ = pi(ρ′) = pi(ρ′′). Let i be
the last state such that they coincide: ρ′i = ρ
′′
i and ρ
′
i+1 6= ρ
′′
i+1. Since pi(ρ
′) = pi(ρ′′) we have that they
differ only by the second component. We can assume without loss of generality that there is are actions a
and b such that (ρi, a) ∈ Ej (where player j controls ρi), (ρi, b) 6∈ Ej and δ(ρi, a) = ρi+1 = δ(ρi, b). This
means that there is are actions a and b such that (s, a) ∈ Ej (where player j controls ρi), (s, b) 6∈ Ej and
δ(ρi, a) = ρi+1 = δ(ρi, b). We have δ(ρi, b) = δ(ρi, a), then by definition of Ej and because (ρi, a) ∈ Ej ,
Valj(δ(s, a)) = Valj(s) therefore Valj(δ(s, b)) = Valj(s) and by definition of Ej , (ρi, b) belongs to Ej which
contradicts our assumptions and ends the proof.
We write pi the bijection which, to ρ′ ∈ OutG′
i
associates ρ ∈ OutG with ρ ∼ ρ′. We extend pi as a mapping
from strategies of G′i to strategies of G by pi(σ
′
i)(h) = σ
′
i(pi
−1(h)). We can notice that for all strategies σ′i,
pi(OutG′
i
(σ′i)) = OutG(pi(σ
′
i)).
Lemma 16. Let G be a game, and i a player. Player i has a winning strategy for Ωi in G if, and only if,
he has a winning strategy for Ω′i in G
′
i. Moreover if σ
′
i is winning for Ω
′
i in G
′
i then pi(σ
′
i) is winning for Ωi
in G.
Proof. We will first rewrite Ωi in a form that is closer to that of Ω
′
i. The objective Ωi is defined by
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OutG(Admi) ∩ (OutG(Adm−i)⇒ φi). Observe that OutG(Adm−i) = ∩j 6=iOutG(Admj) by definition.
Ωi = OutG(Admi) ∩

⋂
j 6=i
OutG(Admj)⇒ φi


Ωi = Φi ∩ OutG ∩



OutG ∩
⋂
j 6=i
Φj

⇒ φi

 using Lem. 3
Ωi = Φi ∩ OutG ∩

⋂
j 6=i
Φj ⇒ φi


Ωi = OutG ∧ G(Ei) ∧Mi ∧



⋂
j 6=i
Mj ⇒ φi

 ∨
∨
j 6=i
¬G(Ej)


Ωi = OutG ∧ G(Ei) ∧Mi ∧



⋂
j 6=i
Mj ⇒ φi

 ∨
∨
j 6=i
F(¬Ej)


⇒ Let σi be a winning strategy for Ωi in G. We consider the strategy σ′i defined by σ
′
i(h
′) = σi(pi(h
′))
and will show that it is winning for Ω′i. Let ρ
′ be an outcome of σ′i. We have that pi(ρ
′) is an outcome of σi.
Since σi is winning for Ωi, pi(ρ
′) belongs to Ωi.
• If pi(ρ′) |= Mi ∧ G(Ei) ∧
∨
j 6=i F(¬Ej), then by construction of δ
′ the play ρ′ reaches a state of S× {⊤}
and, from there, only states of S× {⊤} are visited. The condition GF(S× {⊤}) ∧Mi is met by ρ
′ and
therefore ρ′ is winning for Ω′i.
• Otherwise pi(ρ′) |= Mi ∧ G(Ei) ∧ (
∧
j 6=iMj) ⇒ φi. By construction of δ
′ the play ρ′ stays in S × {0}.
The condition GF(S× {0}) ∧Mi ∧ (
∧
j 6=iMj)⇒ φi is met by ρ
′ and therefore ρ′ ∈ Ω′i.
This shows that the strategy σ′i is winning for Ω
′
i in G
′
i.
⇐ Let σ′i be a winning strategy for Ω
′
i in G
′
i, we show that pi(σ
′
i) is winning for Ωi in G. Let ρ be an
outcome of pi(σ′i). We have that pi
−1(ρ) is an outcome of σ′i. Since σ
′
i is winning for Ω
′
i, pi
−1(ρ) belongs to
Ω′i. We have that pi
−1(ρ) |= GF(S × {0,⊤}) and by construction of δ′ this ensures that all edges that are
taken belong to Ei and thus pi
−1(ρ) satisfies the condition G(Ei).
• If pi−1(ρ) |= GF(S×{⊤})∧Mi then by construction of δ′, an edge outside of Ej for some j 6= i is taken.
This ensures condition F(¬Ej) and therefore ρ belongs to Ωi.
• otherwise pi−1(ρ) |= (
∧
j 6=iMj ⇒ φi) and therefore ρ satisfies the condition G(Ei)∧Mi∧
(⋂
j 6=iMj ⇒ φi
)
and hence belongs to Ωi.
This shows that the strategy pi(σ′i) is winning for Ωi in G.
This characterization immediately yields the decidability of the problem in PSPACE. Moreover, PSPACE-
hardness follows from that of Muller games. We also provide a polynomial-time algorithms for the particular
case of Bu¨chi conditions. The following theorem proves the first statement of Theorem 4; the second
statement is proved afterwards (Theorem 7).
Theorem 6. AA-synthesis in multiplayer Muller games is PSPACE-complete and P-complete for Bu¨chi
objectives.
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Proof. We use the result of [4, Prop. 8] in the special case where n = 1, in which case the proposition
says that for multi-player games with Muller objectives, checking whether Vali((Admi(G))i∈P , sinit) = 1 is
in PSPACE. By Lem. 14, with one call to this algorithm for each player, we are able to decide if AA has a
solution and this proves PSPACE membership. For hardness we encode 2-players zero-sum Muller games in
our setting: the first player keep the same objective and the second one is always winning. In this setting
no strategy of the second player is dominated so finding an AA winning strategy for the first player is the
same as finding a winning strategy in the original game.
Bu¨chi Case In the case of Bu¨chi objectives, let us write φi = GF(Bi) and consider the objective Mi =
GF(Vi,1)⇒ GF(Bi)∧GF(Vi,0)⇒ (GF(Bi)∨GF(Hi)). In G, a run that verifies G(Ei) will either visit only Vi,1 after
some point, or only Vi,−1 after some point, or only Vi,0 (see the proof of Lemma 3 for details). This means that
Mi coincide with GF((Vi,1∧Bi)∨(Vi,0∧Bi)∨(Vi,0∧Hi)∨Vi,−1) on the languageOutG(Σ)∩G(Ei). This is a Bu¨chi
condition. Note that in G′i, runs that take an edge outside of Ei end in the S×{⊥} component and Ω
′
i disallows
such runs. Therefore, in the expression of Ω′i, we can also replace M
′
i by a Bu¨chi condition that we write
GF(BMi ). By abuse of notation we will also write Bi for the states Bi×{⊥, 0,⊤} of the game G
′
i. Consider now
the objective Ω′i, it is given by (GF(S×{0})∧GF(B
M
i )∧(
∧
j 6=i GF(B
M
j )⇒ GF(Bi×{⊥, 0,⊤})))∨(GF(S×{⊤})∧
GF(BMi )). Since in this game, states of S×⊤ and S×⊥ are absorbing (no play can get out of those components)
we write an equivalent objective which is: (GF(BMi × {0}) ∧ (
∧
j 6=i GF(B
M
j ) ⇒ GF(Bi))) ∨ (GF(B
M
i × {⊤}).
We define a (small) deterministic parity automaton A that recognizes this language. Its state space is
({s, t, u, v} × ({j | j ∈ P \ {i}} ∪ {⊤})), the transition relation is a product of transitions for the two
components: s
BMi ×{0,⊤}−−−−−−−→ u, u
¬BMi−−−→ t, t, u
BMi \Bi−−−−−→, t, u
Bi−−→ v, v −→ s, and j
¬Bj×{0}
−−−−−−→ j, j
Bj×{0}
−−−−−→ j′ where
j′ is j + 1 if j + 1 ∈ P \ {i}, j + 2 if j + 1 = i and j + 2 ∈ P , ⊤ otherwise, ⊤ −→ j0 where j0 is the smallest
element of P \ {i}. The coloring is defined by a function χ where χ(v, ∗) = 4 (where ∗ is any possible second
component), χ({s, t, u},⊤) = 3), χ(u,P \ {i}) = 2, and for all other states s, χ(s) = 1. A word is accepted
by A when the maximal color appearing infinitely often is even.
We show that a play of G′i satisfies Ω
′
i if, and only if, it is a word accepted by A.
Let ρ be a play of G′i which satisfies Ω
′
i, either it ends in the S×⊤ component or the S× 0 component:
• If ρ ends in the ⊤ component then the state of color 3 will not be visited infinitely often (we need
to be in ⊤ states to progress on this component of the automaton). As ρ visits infinitely often BMi ,
the corresponding run in A will visit infinitely often u, and therefore the maximal color that appears
infinitely often is at least 2; and since it is not 3, it has to be even.
• Otherwise ρ ends in the 0 component. Since ρ satisfies Ω′i, it visits B
M
i infinitely often and either there
is a BMj for j 6= i that is not visited infinitely often, or ρ visits infinitely often Bi.
– If there is a BMj for j 6= i that is not visited infinitely often, then the second component of A will
get stuck at some point and its state ⊤ will not be visited infinitely often the state of color 3. As
ρ visits infinitely often BMi , the corresponding run in A will visit infinitely often u, and therefore
the maximal color that appears infinitely often is at least 2; and since it is not 3, it has to be
even.
– Otherwise ρ visits infinitely often Bi. Since we also visit B
M
i infinitely often, the run of A corre-
sponding to ρ will reach infinitely often a state (v, ∗) and therefore the maximal color occurring
infinitely often is 4.
This proves that the word is accepted by A.
Now let ρ be a play of G′i such that the corresponding word is accepted by A. If it is accepted then either
the color 4 is seen infinitely often or the color 2 is and the color 3 is not:
• If the color 4 is visited infinitely often then this means t is reached infinitely often, and because of the
structure of A, u also is, which means both BMi × {0} and Bi occur infinitely often. This implies that
the run ρ belongs to Ω′i.
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• Otherwise the color 2 is visited infinitely often and 3 is not. The states (∗,⊤) are therefore not visited
infinitely often (otherwise the maximal color would be 3 or 4. We deduce from that and the structure
of A that some BMj for j 6= i is not visited infinitely often. This means
∧
j 6=i GF(B
M
j ) is not true
for ρ. Since the color 2 is seen infinitely often, this means u, ∗ is seen infinitely often and therefore
Bi × {0,⊤}. This ensures ρ belongs to Ω
′
i.
This proves that a play of G′i satisfy Ω
′
i if, and only if, it is a word accepted by A.
Then solving the game G′i with objective Ω
′
i is the same as solving it with objective given by A. This
can be done by solving the parity game obtained by the product of G′i with the automaton A. The obtained
game is of polynomial size and the number of priority is 4, such games can be solved in polynomial time (see
for instance [22, 28]) and therefore we can decide our problem in polynomial time.
We are now interested in computing an AA-winning strategy profile. Thanks to Lemma 16, we obtain an
algorithm to compute AA-winning strategies by looking for winning strategies in G′i and projecting them:
Theorem 7. Given a game G with Muller objectives, if AA has a solution, then an AA-winning strategy
profile can be computed in exponential time.
Proof. If AA has a solution, then by Lemma 16, there is a winning strategy for Ω′i in G
′
i. This Muller game
has polynomial size, hence we can compute a winning strategy σ′i in exponential time (for instance in [26] the
authors show that we can compute such a winning strategy via a safety game of size |S|!3). By Lemma 16, the
projection pi(σ′i) is an AA-winning strategy. Doing this for each player we obtain a strategy profile solution
of AA.
D Complements on Abstraction (Section 7)
D.1 Abstract Games
The pair of abstraction and concretization functions (α, γ) actually defines a Galois connection:
Lemma 17. The pair (α, γ) is a Galois connection, that is, for all S ⊆ S and T ⊆ Sa, we have that α(S) ⊆ T
if, and only if, S ⊆ γ(T ).
Proof. ⇒ Let s ∈ S. Since γ defines a partition of S, there exists t ∈ Sa such that s ∈ γ(t). By definition
of α, α(s) = t. Assuming α(S) ⊆ T , we have that t ∈ T . As s ∈ γ(t), we have s ∈ γ(T ).
⇐ If sa ∈ α(S), then there is s ∈ S such that sa = α(s). Assuming S ⊆ γ(T ), there is t ∈ T such that
s = γ(t). By definition of α, we have that α(s) = t. Therefore sa ∈ T .
We prove the soundness of the abstract arenas AC we defined, by showing that if coalition C achieves
an objective in G, then it also achieves the objective in AC .
Lemma 5. If the coalition C has a winning strategy for objective φk in G from s then it has a winning
strategy for φak in A
C from α(s).
Proof. Assume σC is a winning profile of coalition C, for objective φk in G. We define by induction a winning
strategy σaC in G
a,k,C . We assume that σaC has been defined in a manner such that for each finite outcome
ha of σaC shorter than some bound m, there is some h ∈ γ(h
a) such that h is a finite outcome of σC . The
idea is then to define σaC to resolve the determinism in a way which simulates the behavior from h.
• If sai ∈
⋃
i∈P S
a
i × Acti, then σ
a
C(h
a · (last(ha), a)) = γ(t) where t = δ(last(h), a).
• If sa ∈
⋃
i∈C S
a
i , σ
a
C(h
a · (last(ha), a) · sa) = σC(h · δ(last(h), a)).
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With this definition, our induction hypothesis will be respected for histories containing one more step,
and therefore this holds for all histories. Let now ρa be an outcome σaC . By the way we defined this strategy
there is a run ρ outcome of σC such that ρ ∈ γ(ρa). As σC is winning, ρ satisfies the Muller condition φk and
since γ is compatible with players’ objectives, ρa satisfies φak. Which show that C has a winning strategy in
Ga,k,C for φak.
D.2 Abstract Assume-Admissible Synthesis
Value-Preserving Strategies We provide the proofs of the lemmas stated in the core of the paper.
Lemma 6. For all players k and x ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, γ(V k,x) ⊆ Vk,x ⊆ γ(V k,x).
Proof. V k,1 This is a direct consequence of Lemma 5.
V k,−1 If s ∈ Vk,−1 then the coalition P has no winning strategy in G. By determinacy, the empty
coalition has a strategy to ensure ¬φk. Therefore by Lemma 5, the coalition ∅ has a strategy in AP from
α(s) that ensures ¬φk. Therefore s ∈ γ(V k,−1).
V k,0 Recall that Vk,0 = WinP\{k}(A,¬φk) ∩WinP(A, φk). Let s be a state in Vk,0. By Lemma 5, α(s)
belongs to both sides of the intersection, thus α(s) ∈ V k,0. Thus Vk,0 ⊆ γ(V k,0).
V k,1 If s
a ∈ V k,1 then the coalition P \ {k} has no strategy in A
P\{k} for ¬φak. Therefore by Lemma 5,
it has no strategy in A from any state of γ(sa) to do so. Therefore k has a winning strategy in A from γ(sa),
and γ(sa) ∈ Vk,1.
V k,−1 If s
a ∈ V k,−1, then the coalition P has no winning strategy in A
P for objective φak. Therefore
by Lemma 5, it has no winning strategy in A from γ(sa) neither for the objective φk. This means that
γ(sa) ∈ Vk,−1.
V k,0 Note that by definition of the νX. operator, V k,0 ⊆ F . Thus, let us just show that γ(F ) ⊆ Vk,0.
Recall that Vk,0 = WinP\{k}(A,¬φk) ∩ WinP(A, φk). Let s ∈ γ(V k,0). Then player k has no strategy
in A{k} for φak, hence, by Lemma 5, it cannot win A neither for φk from γ(s). This shows that γ(s) ⊆
WinP\{k}(A,¬φ
a
k). Furthermore, the coalition ∅ has no strategy in A
P for ¬φak, thus it does not have one
neither in A for ¬φk from γ(s). In other terms, γ(s) ⊆WinP(A, φk).
We show that when playing according to Ek, player k ensures staying in V . This is proven in the
following. Let us write γ(E) = {(s, a) | (α(s), a) ∈ E} for E ∈ {Ek, Ek}.
Lemma 18. For all games G, and players k, 1. γ(Ek ∩ (V ×Act)) ⊆ Ek ⊆ γ(Ek). 2. For all s
a ∈ Sak, there
exist a, a′ ∈ Actk such that (sa, a) ∈ Ek and (s
a, a′) ∈ Ek. 3. For all (sa, a) ∈ Ek with s
a ∈ V , we have
post∆(s
a, a) ⊆ V .
Proof. The inclusion Ek ⊆ γ(Ek) follows from the definition of Ek, and by Lemma 6. It also follows that
for all s ∈ Sak, there is (s, a
′) ∈ Ek, since this is always the case for Ek.
Let (sa, a) be an edge in Ek ∩ (V × Act). Let s be a state in γ(s
a). We have that s ∈ γ(V k,x) for some
x ∈ {−1, 0, 1} and by Lemma 6 s ∈ Vk,x. By definition of Ek, for all t
a such that ∆(sa, a, ta), ta ∈ V k,l
with l ≥ x and sa ∈ V k,x. By Lemma 6, we have that the value of all states in γ(t
a) are at least as great
as any state in γ(sa). By definition of ∆, α(δ(s, a)) ⊆ {ta | ∆(sa, a, ta)}. Therefore α(δ(s, a)) ∈ ∪l≥xV k,l,
which means δ(s, a) ∈ ∪l≥xγ(∪l≥xV k,l) ⊆ ∪l≥xVk,l using Lemma 6. By definition of Ek this implies that
(s, a) ∈ Ek.
It remains to prove that for all sa ∈ Sak, there is (s
a, a) ∈ Ek, and that if s
a ∈ V , then for all (sa, a) ∈ Ek,
∆(sa, a, ta) implies ta ∈ V .
If sa ∈ Sak \ V , then (s
a, a) ∈ Ek for all a ∈ Actk by definition. Let us now assume s
a ∈ V .
• If sa ∈ V k,−1, then By definition of V k,−1, we have that for all actions a, and all states t
a, if ∆a(sa, a, ta)
then ta ∈ V k,−1. Thus (s
a, a) ∈ Ek, and t
a ∈ V k,−1 for any such t
a, so ta ∈ V .
• If s ∈ V k,1, then there exists a such that (s
a, a, ta) ∈ ∆a implies ta ∈ V k,1. So (s
a, a) ∈ Ek, and
ta ∈ V k,1. Moreover this holds for all a with (s
a, a) ∈ Ek, since for such a, (s
a, a, ta) ∈ ∆a implies
ta ∈ V k,1 by definition of Ek.
• If s ∈ V k,0, then by the greatest fixpoint defining V k,0, there exists a ∈ Actk such that for all t
a with
∆(sa, a, ta), ta ∈ V k,0. Conversely, for all (s
a, a) ∈ Ek, a ensures staying inside V k,0 ∪ V k,1. Thus for
any such a, (sa, a) ∈ Ek, and any t
a, ∆(sa, a, ta) means ta ∈ V k,0.
Recall that Ek does not constrain the actions outside the set V ; thus strategies in Stratk(Ek) can actually
choose dominated actions outside V . To prove that Stratk(Ek) is an under-approximation of Stratk(Ek) when
started in V , we need to formalize the fact that admissible strategies may choose arbitrary actions at states
that are not reachable by any outcome. Intuitively, such strategies cannot be dominated since the dominated
behavior is never observed.
For any strategy σ, let Reach(G, σ) denote the set of states reachable from sinit by runs compatible with σ.
We show that if one arbitrarily modifies an admissible strategy outside the set Reach(G, σ), the resulting
strategy is still admissible.
Lemma 19. Let σ be a strategy in Admi(G) and σ
′ a strategy in Σi(G). If for all histories h such that
last(h) ∈ Reach(G, σ), ⇒ σ(h) = σ′(h), then σ′ ∈ Admi(G).
Proof. For all profiles σ−k ∈ Σ−k(G), we have OutG(σ−k, σ) = OutG(σ−k, σ′) so if σ′ is dominated, then σ
would also be dominated, which is a contradiction.
Lemma 7. For all games G, and players k, Stratk(Ek) ⊆ γ(Stratk(Ek)), and if sinit ∈ γ(V ), then ∅ 6=
γ(Stratk(Ek)) ⊆ Stratk(Ek).
Proof. Since Ek ⊆ γ(Ek) by Lemma 18, we have Stratk(Ek) ⊆ γ(Stratk(γ(Ek))).
Assume sinit ∈ γ(V ). The fact that Stratk(Ek), thus also γ(Stratk(Ek)) are non-empty follows from
Lemma 18 too, since for any state sa there is a ∈ Actk with (sa, a) ∈ Ek.
We prove that Reach(AP\{k}, σ) ⊆ V for all σ ∈ Stratk(Ek). We already know, by Lemma 18, that for
all sa ∈ V , if (sa, a) ∈ Ek then all successors t
a with ∆(sa, a, ta) satisfies ta ∈ V . We are going to show that
for all sa ∈ V ∩ Saj with j 6= k, for all a ∈ Actj , ∆
a(sa, a, ta) implies ta ∈ V .
Consider sa ∈ V . If sa ∈ V k,1, then for all a ∈ Act, ∆
a(sa, a, ta) implies that ta ∈ V k,1, since P \ {k}
resolves non-determinism. The situation is similar if sa ∈ V k,−1; for all a ∈ Actj , ∆
a(sa, a, ta) implies
ta ∈ V k,−1. If s
a ∈ V k,0, then, by the definition of the outer fixpoint, for all a ∈ Actj , ∆
a(sa, a, ta) implies
that ta ∈ V .
Thus Reach(AP\{k}, σ) ⊆ V for all σ ∈ Stratk(Ek). It then follows that Reach(G, γ(σ)) ⊆ γ(V ). So, by
Lemma 19, and by the fact that γ(Ek) ⊆ Ek, all strategies in γ(Stratk(Ek)) are value preserving, which is
to say, belong to Stratk(Ek).
Help States
Lemma 20. For all players k, γ(Hk) ⊆ Hk ⊆ γ(Hk).
Proof. Let sa ∈ Hk, and let a, b ∈ Act two witnessing actions. For all s ∈ γ(s
a), we have δ(s, a) ∈
γ(post∆(s
a, a)) ⊆ Vk,0 ∪ Vk,1 and δ(s, b) ∈ γ(post∆(s
a, a)) ⊆ Vk,0 ∪ Vk,1. Moreover α(δ(s, a)) ∈ post∆(s
a, a),
α(δ(s, b)) ∈ post∆(s
a, b), and post∆(s
a, a) ∩ post∆(s
a, b) = ∅, therefore α(δ(s, a)) 6= α(δ(s, b)) and thus
δ(s, a) 6= δ(s, b). Hence s ∈ Hk.
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Now, consider any s ∈ Hk; and let a, b ∈ Act be such that δ(s, a), δ(s, b) ∈ Vk,0∪Vk,1 and δ(s, a) 6= δ(s, b).
If we write ta = α(δ(s, a)) and ua = α(δ(s, b)), then ta, ua ∈ V k,0 ∪ V k,1, and ∆(sa, a, ta), and ∆(sa, b, ua);
thus α(s) ∈ Hk. It follows that Hk ⊆ γ(Hk).
Synthesizing AA-winning Strategies
Lemma 21. We have γ(M ′k) ⊆M
′
k ⊆ γ(M
′
k).
Proof. We have γ(φak) = φk by assumption on γ. Thus, by Lemma 6,
γ((GF(V k,1)⇒ φ
a
k)) ⊆ GF(Vk,1)⇒ φk) ⊆ γ((GF(V k,1)⇒ φ
a
k)).
Similarly, by Lemma 20, we get γ
(
GF(V k,0)⇒ (φ
a
k ∨ GF(Hk))
)
⊆ GF(Vk,0 ⇒ (φk∨GF(Hk)) ⊆ γ
(
GF(V k,0)⇒ (φ
a
k ∨ GF(Hk))
)
.
It follows that γ(M ′k) ⊆M
′
k ⊆ γ(M
′
k).
The following lemma proves Theorem 5.
Lemma 22. Let k ∈ P be a player and σk a strategy of player k. If sainit ∈ V , and σk is winning for objective
Ω′k in A
′
k, then γ(σk) is winning for Ω
′
k in G
′
k.
Proof. Let us rewrite
Ω′i =M
′
i ∧



GF(Sa × {0}) ∧ (
∧
j 6=i
M ′j ⇒ φ
a
i )

 ∨ GF(Sa × {⊤})

 .
Let σk be a winning strategy in A′k for Ω
′
k. We will show that G
′, γ(σk) |= Ω′k.
Consider any run ρ of G′k compatible with γ(σk). By definition of γ(σk), α(ρ) is a run of A
′
k compatible
with σk. Since σk is a winning strategy, α(ρ) ∈M ′k, and by Lemma 21 ρ ∈M
′
k.
We now show that ρ ∈ GF(S× {0,⊤}). By assumption, we have A′k, σk |= GF(S
a × {0,⊤}), which means
that for all histories ha of A′k compatible with σk, (last(h
a), σ(ha)) ∈ Ek (otherwise the transition relation of
A′k would lead to a ⊥ state). Moreover, since s
a
init ∈ V , it follows from Lemma 7 that (last(h), γ(σ)(h)) ∈ Ek
for all histories h compatible with γ(σk). Thus no state (∗,⊥) is reachable under γ(σ) in G
′
k.
Because of the structure of G′k this means that ρ either visits states of S × {0} or states of S × {⊤}
infinitely often:
• If ρ ∈ GF(S× {0}), then α(ρ) ∈ GF(Sa × {0}); so α(ρ) ∈
∧
j 6=kM
′
j ⇒ φak; it follows, by Lemma 21 and
the compatibility of the abstraction with players’ objectives, that ρ ∈
∧
j 6=kM
′
j ⇒ φk. Thus ρ ∈ Ω
′
k.
• Otherwise ρ ∈ GF(S× {⊤}), so ρ ∈ Ω′k.
Thus any outcome ρ of γ(σk) belongs to Ω
′
k which shows it is winning.
E Algorithm for Assume-Guarantee Synthesis
The assume-guarantee-∧ rule was studied in [6] for particular games with three players. However, the
given proofs are based on secure equilibria which do not actually capture assume-guarantee synthesis, so
the correctness of the algorithm is not clear. Here, we give an alternative algorithm for deciding assume-
guarantee-∧ for multiplayer games, and prove its correctness.
For any game G, and state s, we denote by Gs the game obtained making s the initial state. Assuming
that for each player i has an objective φi which is prefix independent, let us defineWi = {s ∈ S | ∃σi. Gs, σi |=∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi}.
The following lemma gives a decidable characterization of assume-guarantee synthesis:
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Lemma 23. Let φi be a prefix-independent objective. Rule AG
∧ has a solution if, and only if, there is a
run ρ which visits only states of
⋂
i∈P Wi and such that ρ |=
∧
i∈P φi.
Proof. ⇒ Let σP be a solution of AG
∧. Let ρ be its outcome. We have that ρ |=
∧
i∈P φi by hypothesis
of AG∧. Let i be a player, we show that ρ only visits states of Wi. This is because σi is winning for∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi. For all k, ρ≤k is a finite outcome of σi, and the strategy played by σi after this history is
winning for
∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi, which means that ρk belongs to Wi. Hence ρ satisfies the desired conditions.
⇐ If there is such a run ρ, we define the strategy profile σP to follow this run if no deviation has
occurred and otherwise each player i plays a strategy which is winning for
∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi if possible. We
show that such a strategy profile satisfies the assumption of assume-guarantee. Obviously σP |=
∧
i∈P φi.
Let ρ′ be an outcome of σi and k the first index such that ρ
′
k 6= ρk. The state ρ
′
k−1 = ρk−1 is not controlled
by player i, because σi follows ρ. As ρk−1 is in Wi and not controlled by player i, this means that ρ
′
k ∈ Wi.
Therefore σi plays a winning strategy from ρ
′
k for the objective
∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi; thus ρ
′ satisfies this
objective. Hence σP is a solution of AG
∧.
We deduce a polynomial-space algorithm for the AG∧ rule with Muller objectives:
Theorem 8. For multi-player games with Muller objectives, deciding whether AG∧ has a solution is PSPACE-
complete.
Proof. The algorithms proceed by computing the set Wi for each player i with an algorithm that computes
winning regions and then checks whether there is an infinite run in the intersection
⋂
i∈P Wi which satisfies∧
i∈P φi. This algorithm is correct thanks to Lemma 23.
This is in PSPACE because the objective
∧
j∈P\{i} φj ⇒ φi can be expressed by a Muller condition
encoded by a circuit [20] of polynomial size. We can decide in polynomial space if a given state is winning
for a Muller condition given by a circuit. Thus, the set
⋂
i∈P Wi can be computed in polynomial space; let
us denote by G′ the game restricted to this set. The algorithm then consists in finding a run in G′ satisfying∧
i∈P φi; that is, finding a run satisfying a Muller condition, which can be done in polynomial space.
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